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Abstract 
In the paper, we are encouraged to investigate the effect of game structure imposed on the 
minimum-time needed to economic maturity in a dynamic macroeconomic model. Indeed, we have 
established a basic framework for the comparative study of the cooperative stochastic differential 
game and dynamic sequential game of economic maturity. Moreover, in a simple stochastic growth 
model, closed-form solution of the minimum-time needed to economic maturity has been derived 
with the explicit condition, under which it is confirmed that cooperation between the 
representative household and the self-interested politician will definitely lead us to much faster 
economic maturity than that of sequential action, supplied, too. Finally, our model supports the 
comparative study of the minimum-time needed to economic maturity under different political- 
institution constraints. 
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1. Introduction 
It is widely noted that institutional difference is one of the major differences between the 
developing economies and the developed economies. Usually, different institutional arrangements 
will form different incentive structures, induce different economic behaviors of the individuals, 
different fiscal policies of the government, and hence different speeds and levels of economic 
maturity. That is, different game structures lead to different institutional arrangements (e.g., North, 
1990; Hurwicz, 1996; Williamson, 2000; Amable, 2003), hence producing different economic 
performances (see, North, 1994; Acemoglu et al., 2005a, 2005b). The major goal of the current 
exploration is to construct a basic framework to comparatively study the minimum-time needed to 
economic maturity under different game structures, i.e., dynamic sequential game and cooperative 
stochastic differential game. Indeed, we have derived closed-form solution of the minimum-time 
needed to economic maturity in a simple model of endogenous economic growth (e.g., Barro, 1990; 
Rebelo, 1991; Turnovsky, 2000; Aghion, 2004; Wälde, 2011; Dai, 2012), where competitive 
assumption is employed for the firm, endogenous savings rate is determined by the representative 
household and the goal of the self-interested politician is to choose a tax policy such that the utility 
from tax revenue, which can be viewed as the rent, is maximized. Leong and Huang (2010) confirm 
that uncertainty will produce more realistic solution than that of the deterministic case (see, Kaitala 
and Pohjola, 1990). We also consider a stochastic environment as in Merton (1975), i.e., the source of 
uncertainty is the population size. In addition to that, the explicit condition, under which 
cooperation between the representative household and the self-interested politician will lead to 
much faster economic maturity than that of sequential action, has been supplied for the first time. 
And in fact, the explicit condition is determined by the relevant model parameters, such as 
discount factor, technology parameter, depreciation factor, variance term, and the natural rate of 
population growth. 
The current investigation focuses on the issue of economic maturity for any underdeveloped 
economy. We argue that the state of economic maturity can be interpreted as a Golden Age (e.g., 
Phelps, 1961) or a turnpike (see, McKenzie, 1963a; Dai, 2012) of the economy and the formal 
definition of the minimum-time needed to economic maturity has been stated using mathematical 
language. Indeed, we pay more attention to economic development rather than purely economic 
growth (see, Solow, 2003; Aghion, 2004). Moreover, it’s easy to notice that our paper is a natural 
extension of the seminal and interesting paper of Kurz (1965), where optimal paths of capital 
accumulation under the minimum-time objective are thoroughly investigated. It is, nevertheless, 
worthwhile emphasizing that the minimum-time needed to economic maturity is endogenously 
determined in our model. And this would be regarded as an advantage of the optimal stopping 
theory used here. 
Some seminal papers (see, Judd, 1985; Chamley, 1986; Phelan and Stacchetti, 2001, and among 
others) study dynamic optimal Ramsey taxation under the crucial assumption that taxes are set by 
benevolent governments. Nevertheless, in practice and also in line with the public choice theory 
(e.g., Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986), the politician’s preferences may 
diverge from those of his constituents and that he may pursue his self-interest. Indeed, some 
existing literatures study the dynamic taxation under the assumption that taxes are decided by a 
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self-interested politician. For example, Acemoglu et al. (2008, 2010, 2011) consider the case where 
the self-interested politicians have the power to set taxes and meanwhile the citizens can discipline 
politicians using elections or other means. Moreover, Acemoglu et al. (2008, 2010, 2011) analyze the 
political economy distortions by supplying that the politician has the power to allocate some of the 
tax revenue to himself as rents or government consumption, and also a formal politician utility, 
which is usually different from that of the individual or citizen, is supplied. Yared (2010) 
characterizes optimal tax policies in the presence of rent-seeking politicians whose utilities increase 
in rents, which are defined as excessive public spending with no social value, and also highlights 
how the incentives of rent-seeking politicians affect optimal policy prescriptions. As you can see 
below, we also suppose a self-interested politician in our model. And we further consider three 
types of self-interested politician, i.e., strongly self-interested politician, semi-strongly self- 
interested politician, and weakly self-interested politician, in order to sufficiently reflect different 
political institutions in reality. That is, we have provided a general framework for the study of the 
economic effect of the minimum-time needed to economic maturity with respect to different 
political institutions. Noting that North (1994) has emphasized that political and economic 
institutions are the underlying determinants of economic performance, hence our model provides 
us with a useful framework in which we can explicitly explore in which way and to what extent 
political institutions affect economic performance in a specific growth model. 
Starting with time inconsistency being introduced by the seminal paper of Kydland and Prescott 
(1977), latter papers, such as Chari and Kehoe (1990, 1993), argue that fiscal-policy problems should 
be better studied as a dynamic game between the government and the households. For instance, in 
a repeated-game framework, Chari and Kehoe (1990) focus on sustainable plans characterized by 
symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria. Similar to the sustainable equilibrium defined and analyzed 
by Chari and Kehoe (1990), Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) provide a formal definition of a sequential 
equilibrium for the dynamic policy game between the government and the households, and also 
develop a strategic dynamic programming method. Acemoglu et al. (2008, 2010, 2011) study 
dynamic taxation policy in the context of a dynamic game between a self-interested government 
and citizens, and characterize the best sub-game perfect equilibrium of this game from the 
viewpoint of the citizens. Yared (2010) considers an infinitely repeated game between citizens and 
rent-seeking politicians with double-sided lack of commitment in which reputation mechanism 
sustains efficient equilibrium policies. Also, Farhi and Werning (2008) study efficient nonlinear 
taxation in a dynamic game with political economy constraints and without commitment, it is 
revealed that reputational mechanism induces a trigger-strategy equilibrium, where a deviation 
would be followed by the worst possible continuation equilibrium. In our study, it is however 
illustrated that under certain conditions the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium may result in 
dynamic inefficiency when compared to the cooperative equilibrium, and also sub-game 
consistency, which is a much stronger concept than that of time consistency (see, Fischer, 1980; 
Klein et al., 2008) in some sense, has been demonstrated to be met for the current model by heavily 
employing the technique developed by Yeung and Petrosyan (2006). In other words, we employ 
backward induction principle to ensure time consistency in the dynamic sequential game while 
using sub-game consistency to ensure time consistency in the cooperative stochastic differential 
game. To sum up, the present model has supplied a useful framework for the comparative study of 
the dynamic sequential game emphasized by Phelan and Stacchetti (2001), Acemoglu et al. (2008, 
2010, 2011) and the cooperative differential game studied by Kaitala and Pohjola (1990), Yeung and 
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Petrosyan (2006) and Leong and Huang (2010) in a stochastic growth model under political- 
economy constraint. And hence our study would be regarded as a natural extension of existing 
literatures. 
The current paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 thoroughly introduces some basic definitions 
and the computation algorithm of the sequential-equilibrium minimum-time needed to economic 
maturity. Sections 3 and 4 derive the sequential-equilibrium and cooperative-equilibrium 
minimum-time needed to economic maturity, respectively, in a very general framework. In section 
5, we discuss some specific examples with closed-form solutions derived by applying the general 
model established in sections 3 and 4. There is a brief concluding section. 
2. Computation Algorithm of Sequential Equilibrium 
2.1 Minimum-Time Needed to Economic Maturity 
Suppose that we are given a probability space (Ω,ℱ,ℙ), the optimization problem facing the 
economic agent is expressed as follows, 
max
𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡)≥0 𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠 �� 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠)𝑢𝑢�𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏∗𝑠𝑠 + 𝑈𝑈𝜏𝜏∗𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏∗<∞}�                                                   (1) 
subject to the corresponding law of motion of capital accumulation with 𝑐𝑐 denoting per capita 
consumption and with 𝑈𝑈𝜏𝜏∗ given by, 
𝑈𝑈𝜏𝜏
∗
𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏∗<∞} ∶= sup
𝜏𝜏∈𝒯𝒯
𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠�𝑒𝑒
−𝜌𝜌(𝜏𝜏−𝑠𝑠)𝑢𝑢�𝑐𝑐(𝜏𝜏)�𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏<∞}�                                                  (2) 
subject to the law of motion of capital accumulation and 𝒯𝒯 ∶= {ℱ −  stopping times}. Hence, we give, 
Definition 1 (Minimum-Time Needed to Economic Maturity). The optimal stooping time 𝜏𝜏∗ 
determined by (2) defines a minimum-time needed to economic maturity in the sense of Radner 
Preference. 
About the definition of Radner Preference, one may refer to the classical paper of Radner (1961). 
And one can easily notice that the specification in (2) efficiently captures the Ratchet effect 
emphasized by traditional consumption theory and hence we would also call it the “peak 
preference” with the purpose of reflecting the psychological effect in consumption. As is well- 
known, when discussing efficient capital accumulation, efficiency is usually defined with reference 
to the final state (see, Radner, 1961; Kurz, 1965; Dai, 2012) or the terminal stock (see, McKenzie, 
1963b, 1976). In this paper, the terminal stock, equivalent to efficient capital accumulation in some 
sense, is endogenously determined as well as the minimum-time needed to economic maturity, 
which is an optimal stopping time that maximizes the final-state objective function of the economic 
agent, i.e., choosing a minimum time so as to maximize the discounted utility function, which, to 
some extent, resembles Kurz’s (1965) specification, that is, minimizing the time needed to reach the 
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state of economic maturity. 
2.2 Types of Self-Interested Politician 
Now, we introduce three types of self-interested politician according to the above specification. 
Firstly, we give the respective preference of the representative household and the self-interested 
politician as follows, 
max
𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻(𝑡𝑡)≥0𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠 �� 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠)𝑢𝑢𝐻𝐻�𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠 + 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝜏𝜏−𝑠𝑠)𝑢𝑢𝐻𝐻�𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻(𝜏𝜏)�𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏<∞}�                                            (3) 
and, 
max
𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃 (𝑡𝑡)≥0 𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠 �� 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠)𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃�𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠 + 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝜏𝜏−𝑠𝑠)𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃�𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃(𝜏𝜏)�𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏<∞}�                                            (4) 
for any 𝜏𝜏 ∈ 𝒯𝒯. Then, we give the following definitions, 
Definition 2 (Self-Interested Politician). We call the politician the self-interested politician when 
he consumes the tax revenue as rent. That is, the politician is not benevolent in the usual sense. 
Definition 3 (Strongly Self-Interested Politician). We call the politician the strongly self-interested 
politician when he is self-interested and also the minimum-time needed to economic maturity 𝜏𝜏∗ is 
determined by, 
𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃,𝜏𝜏∗𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏∗<∞} ∶= sup
𝜏𝜏∈𝒯𝒯
𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠�𝑒𝑒
−𝜌𝜌(𝜏𝜏−𝑠𝑠)𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃�𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃(𝜏𝜏)�𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏<∞}� 
subject to the law of motion of capital accumulation. 
Remark 2.1 In this case, the preference of the representative household is given by (3) while the 
preference of the politician given by, 
𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠 �� 𝑒𝑒
−𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠)𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃�𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏
𝑠𝑠
+ 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃,𝜏𝜏𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏<∞}� 
Definition 4 (Semi-Strongly Self-Interested Politician). We call the politician the semi-strongly 
self-interested politician when he is self-interested and also the minimum-time needed to economic 
maturity 𝜏𝜏∗ ∶= 𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃∗ ∧ 𝜏𝜏𝐻𝐻∗ is determined by, 
𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃,𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃∗𝜒𝜒�𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃∗<∞� ∶= sup
𝜏𝜏∈𝒯𝒯
𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠�𝑒𝑒
−𝜌𝜌(𝜏𝜏−𝑠𝑠)𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃�𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃(𝜏𝜏)�𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏<∞}� 
and, 
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𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻,𝜏𝜏𝐻𝐻∗𝜒𝜒�𝜏𝜏𝐻𝐻∗<∞� ∶= sup
𝜏𝜏∈𝒯𝒯
𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠�𝑒𝑒
−𝜌𝜌(𝜏𝜏−𝑠𝑠)𝑢𝑢𝐻𝐻�𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻(𝜏𝜏)�𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏<∞}� 
subject to the corresponding law of motion of capital accumulation, respectively. 
Remark 2.2 In this case, the preferences of the politician and the representative household are 
respectively given as follows, 
𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠 �� 𝑒𝑒
−𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠)𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃�𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏
𝑠𝑠
+ 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃,𝜏𝜏𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏<∞}� 
and, 
𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠 �� 𝑒𝑒
−𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠)𝑢𝑢𝐻𝐻�𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏
𝑠𝑠
+ 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻,𝜏𝜏𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏<∞}� 
with 𝜏𝜏 ∈ 𝒯𝒯. 
Definition 5 (Weakly Self-Interested Politician). We call the politician the weakly self-interested 
politician when he is self-interested and also the minimum-time needed to economic maturity 𝜏𝜏∗ is 
determined by, 
𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻,𝜏𝜏∗𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏∗<∞} ∶= sup
𝜏𝜏∈𝒯𝒯
𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠�𝑒𝑒
−𝜌𝜌(𝜏𝜏−𝑠𝑠)𝑢𝑢𝐻𝐻�𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻(𝜏𝜏)�𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏<∞}� 
subject to the law of motion of capital accumulation. 
Remark 2.3 In this case, the preferences of the politician and the representative household are 
respectively given as follows, 
𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠 �� 𝑒𝑒
−𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠)𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃�𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏
𝑠𝑠
+ 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝜏𝜏−𝑠𝑠)𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃�𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃(𝜏𝜏)�𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏<∞}� 
and, 
𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠 �� 𝑒𝑒
−𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠)𝑢𝑢𝐻𝐻�𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏
𝑠𝑠
+ 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻,𝜏𝜏𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏<∞}� 
with 𝜏𝜏 ∈ 𝒯𝒯. 
2.3 Computation Algorithm 
We introduce the following computation algorithm by employing the well-known backward 
induction principle, 
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Case 1. There is a strongly self-interested politician in the economy. 
The economic agents will act sequentially and the order of action reads as follows, 
i) The politician determines the minimum-time needed to economic maturity based upon any 
given taxation policy and any given consumption strategy of the representative household. 
ii) Based on i), the politician chooses the taxation policy to maximize his welfare given any 
possible consumption strategy of the representative household. 
iii) Based upon i) and ii), the representative household determines his optimal consumption. 
And hence the corresponding computation algorithm is given by, 
Computation Algorithm I. 
Step 1. The representative household chooses his\her optimal consumption strategy given the 
taxation policy of the politician and the time horizon of the program. 
Step 2. The self-interested politician chooses the taxation policy to maximize his welfare\utility 
given the optimal consumption strategy of the representative household derived in Step 1 and any 
possible time horizon of the program. 
Step 3. Based upon the results derived in Steps 1 and 2, the minimum-time needed to economic 
maturity is established by the strongly self-interested politician. 
Case 2. There is a semi-strongly self-interested politician in the economy. 
Now, the order of action reads as follows, 
i) The politician determines the minimum-time needed to economic maturity 𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃∗ based upon 
any given taxation policy of himself and any given consumption strategy of the 
representative household. 
ii) The politician chooses the taxation policy to maximize his welfare based on i) and given any 
possible consumption strategy of the representative household. 
iii) The representative household determines the minimum-time needed to economic maturity 
𝜏𝜏𝐻𝐻∗ based upon the taxation policy derived in ii). 
iv) The representative household chooses his optimal consumption strategy based upon 𝜏𝜏𝐻𝐻∗ 
and the taxation policy given by ii). 
It follows from the well-known backward induction principle that the computation algorithm is 
given as follows, 
Computation Algorithm II. 
Step 1. The representative household chooses his\her optimal consumption strategy given the 
taxation policy of the politician and the time horizon of the program. 
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Step 2. Based upon Step 1, the minimum-time needed to economic maturity 𝜏𝜏𝐻𝐻∗ is determined 
given any taxation policy of the politician. 
Step 3. Based upon the result derived in Step 1, the taxation policy is determined by the semi- 
strongly self-interested politician. 
Step 4. The minimum-time needed to economic maturity 𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃∗ is determined by the politician based 
upon Steps 1 and 3. 
Step 5. Given the minimum-time needed to economic maturity 𝜏𝜏𝐻𝐻∗ and 𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃∗ derived in Steps 2 and 
4, respectively, we define the unique minimum-time needed to economic maturity as 
𝜏𝜏∗ ∶= 𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃∗ ∧ 𝜏𝜏𝐻𝐻∗. 
Case 3. There is a weakly self-interested politician in the economy. 
Noting that the economic agents will act sequentially, then the order of action reads as follows, 
i) The minimum-time needed to economic maturity is derived by the representative household 
for any given taxation policy of the politician and any given consumption strategy of the 
representative household. 
ii) Based on i), the taxation policy is determined by the politician to maximize his welfare for 
any given consumption strategy of the representative household. 
iii) Based upon i) and ii), the optimal consumption strategy is determined by the representative 
household. 
So, by applying the backward induction principle, we get the following computation algorithm, 
Computation Algorithm III. 
Step 1. The representative household chooses his\her optimal consumption strategy based upon 
any given taxation policy of the politician and any given time horizon of the program. 
Step 2. Provided the result derived in Step 1, the taxation policy is chosen by the self-interested 
politician to maximize his welfare\utility for any possible time horizon of the economy. 
Step 3. The minimum-time needed to economic maturity is established by the representative 
household based upon the results given in Steps 1 and 2. 
Therefore, we have stated all the computation algorithms for the sequential-equilibrium 
minimum-time needed to economic maturity for the above three cases corresponding to three types 
of self-interested politician. 
3. Sequential-Equilibrium Economic Maturity 
3.1 Basic Environment 
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We consider the following neoclassical production function, 
𝑌𝑌(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐹𝐹�𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)�                                                                            (5) 
which is a strictly concave function, and it also exhibits constant returns to scale effect with 𝐾𝐾 
denoting the aggregate capital stock and 𝐿𝐿 representing the labor force or population size. Thus, 
the following law of motion of capital accumulation is derived, 
?̇?𝐾(𝑡𝑡) ∶= 𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
= �1 − 𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡)��𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾�𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)� − 𝛿𝛿�𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡) + �1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊(𝑡𝑡)�𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿�𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)�𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) − �1 + 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡)�𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡) (6) 
where 𝛿𝛿 , a given constant, denotes the depreciation factor, 𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾�𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)� ∶= 𝜕𝜕𝐹𝐹𝜕𝜕𝐾𝐾 �𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)� , 
𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿�𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)� ∶= 𝜕𝜕𝐹𝐹𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿 �𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)� , 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡)  stands for aggregate consumption, and 𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊(𝑡𝑡)  and 
𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡)  represent capital-income tax rate, labor-income tax rate, and consumption tax rate, 
respectively, at period 𝑡𝑡. 
Now, suppose that (𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡), 𝑠𝑠 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑇𝑇) stands for a standard Brownian motion defined on the 
following filtered probability space (Ω,ℱ, {ℱ𝑡𝑡}𝑠𝑠≤𝑡𝑡≤𝑇𝑇 ,ℙ)  with 𝔽𝔽 ∶= {ℱ𝑡𝑡}𝑠𝑠≤𝑡𝑡≤𝑇𝑇  the ℙ −augmented 
filtration generated by (𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡), 𝑠𝑠 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑇𝑇)  with ℱ ∶= ℱ𝑇𝑇  for ∀𝑇𝑇 > 0 , that is, the underlying 
stochastic basis satisfies the well-known usual conditions. Then, based upon the given probability 
space and also in line with Merton (1975), we define, 
𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑛𝑛𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡)                                                              (7) 
subject to 𝐵𝐵(𝑠𝑠) = 0 and 𝜎𝜎 ∈ ℝ0 ∶= ℝ − {0}, a constant. Thus, combining (6) with (7) and applying 
Itô’s Rule leads us to, 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡) = ���1 − 𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡)��𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾�𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)� − 𝛿𝛿� + 𝜎𝜎2 − 𝑛𝑛�𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡) + �1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊(𝑡𝑡)�𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿�𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)�
− �1 + 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡)�𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 − 𝜎𝜎𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡)                                                                                                  (8) 
with initial value 𝑑𝑑(𝑠𝑠) ∶= 𝑑𝑑0 > 0 and 𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡) ∶= 𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡)𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡), 𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡) ∶= 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡)𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) denoting the capital-labor ratio and 
per capita consumption, respectively, at time 𝑡𝑡. 
So, based upon (8), we give the following differential operator for the new process 𝜁𝜁(𝑡𝑡)
∶= (𝑡𝑡 − 𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)), 
10 
𝒜𝒜𝒜𝒜(𝜁𝜁0) ∶= 𝜕𝜕𝒜𝒜𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠 (𝜁𝜁0)+ ���1 − 𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾(0)��𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾�𝐾𝐾(0), 𝐿𝐿(0)� − 𝛿𝛿� + 𝜎𝜎2 − 𝑛𝑛�𝑑𝑑0 + �1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊(0)�𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿�𝐾𝐾(0), 𝐿𝐿(0)�
− �1 + 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶(0)�𝑐𝑐(0)� 𝜕𝜕𝒜𝒜𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑0 (𝜁𝜁0) + 12𝜎𝜎2𝑑𝑑02 𝜕𝜕2𝒜𝒜𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑02 (𝜁𝜁0)                                                                             (9) 
for 𝜁𝜁0 ∶= (0,𝑑𝑑0) and ∀𝒜𝒜 ∈ 𝐶𝐶02(ℝ × ℝ+). 
Noting that both continuity and differentiability are neighborhood properties, we hence fix a 
domain 𝐷𝐷 in ℝ × ℝ+ and the probability law of 𝜁𝜁(𝑡𝑡) starting at 𝜁𝜁0 ∶= (0, 𝑑𝑑0) for 𝑡𝑡 = s is (with 
slight abuse of notation) also denoted by ℙ𝜁𝜁0 . And define, 
𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷 ∶= inf{𝑡𝑡 > 𝑠𝑠;  𝜁𝜁(𝑡𝑡) ∉ 𝐷𝐷} 
Definition 6 (Regular Boundary). Let ∂𝐷𝐷 denote the boundary of the domain 𝐷𝐷, a point 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝜕𝜕𝐷𝐷 
is called regular for 𝐷𝐷 (w.r.t. 𝜁𝜁(𝑡𝑡)) if ℙ𝜁𝜁0 (𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷 = 𝑠𝑠) = 1. 
This definition implies that a.a. paths of 𝜁𝜁(𝑡𝑡) starting from 𝜁𝜁0 leave 𝐷𝐷 immediately. 
Assumption 1. Without loss of generality, 𝐷𝐷 is chosen such that 𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷 is sufficiently large a.s. ℙ𝜁𝜁0 . 
3.2 Sequential-Equilibrium Minimum-Time Needed to Economic Maturity 
Case 1. Suppose that there is a strongly self-interested politician in the economy. 
Applying Computation Algorithm I, we then obtain, 
Problem 1. It is assumed that the economy consists of 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) identical individuals, each of whom 
possesses perfect foresight in period 𝑡𝑡. Thus, the optimization problem facing the representative 
household is expressed as follows, 
max
𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡)≥0 𝐽𝐽𝑐𝑐(𝜁𝜁0) ∶= 𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠 �� 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠)𝑢𝑢𝐻𝐻�𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏∗𝑠𝑠 + 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝜏𝜏∗−𝑠𝑠)𝑢𝑢𝐻𝐻�𝑐𝑐(𝜏𝜏∗)�𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏∗<∞}� 
subject to (8) with 𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠 denoting the expectation operator depending on ℱ𝑠𝑠 and 𝑢𝑢𝐻𝐻(∙) the strictly 
increasing, strictly concave instantaneous utility function of per capita consumption with the well- 
known Inada conditions satisfied. 
So, we get, 
Theorem 1 (Necessity). Define, 
𝜓𝜓𝐻𝐻(𝜁𝜁0) = sup{𝐽𝐽𝑐𝑐(𝜁𝜁0); 𝑐𝑐 = 𝑐𝑐(𝜁𝜁)   𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑑𝑑𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐} 
Suppose that 𝜓𝜓𝐻𝐻 ∈ 𝐶𝐶2(𝐷𝐷) ∩ 𝐶𝐶(𝐷𝐷�) satisfies, 
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𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠 �� |𝒜𝒜𝜓𝜓𝐻𝐻(𝜁𝜁(𝑡𝑡))|𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏∗
𝑠𝑠
+ |𝜓𝜓𝐻𝐻(𝜁𝜁(𝜏𝜏∗))|� < ∞ 
for all bounded stopping times 𝜏𝜏∗ ≤ 𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷 . Moreover, suppose that an optimal Markov control 𝑐𝑐∗ exists and 
that 𝜕𝜕𝐷𝐷 is regular in the sense of Definition 6 for 𝜁𝜁(𝑡𝑡). Then, sup
𝑐𝑐≥0 {𝑒𝑒𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝐻𝐻(𝑐𝑐) + 𝒜𝒜𝜓𝜓𝐻𝐻(𝜁𝜁0)} = 0 
for all 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷, and, 
𝜓𝜓𝐻𝐻(𝜁𝜁0) = 𝑒𝑒𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝐻𝐻(𝑐𝑐) 
for all 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝜕𝜕𝐷𝐷. In other words, the optimal consumption 𝑐𝑐∗ meets, 
𝑒𝑒𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝐻𝐻(𝑐𝑐∗) + 𝒜𝒜𝐽𝐽𝑐𝑐∗(𝜁𝜁0) = 0 
for all 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷. 
Proof. This is a direct application of the Theorem of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) Equation (see, 
Øksendal, 2003). ■ 
Theorem 2 (Sufficiency). Let 𝜑𝜑𝐻𝐻 be a function in 𝐶𝐶2(𝐷𝐷) ∩ 𝐶𝐶(𝐷𝐷�) such that for all 𝑐𝑐 ≥ 0, 
𝑒𝑒𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝐻𝐻(𝑐𝑐) + 𝒜𝒜𝜑𝜑𝐻𝐻(𝜁𝜁0) ≤ 0 
for all 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷 with boundary values, lim
𝑡𝑡→𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷
𝜑𝜑𝐻𝐻(𝜁𝜁(𝑡𝑡)) = 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷−𝑠𝑠)𝑢𝑢𝐻𝐻�𝑐𝑐(𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷)�𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷<∞} 
a.s. ℙ𝜁𝜁0 , and such that, {𝜑𝜑𝐻𝐻−(𝜁𝜁(𝜏𝜏∗)); 𝜏𝜏∗𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝜏𝜏∗ ≤ 𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷} 
is uniformly ℙ𝜁𝜁0 −integrable for all Markov controls 𝑐𝑐 and all 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷. Then, 
𝜑𝜑𝐻𝐻(𝜁𝜁0) ≥ 𝐽𝐽𝑐𝑐(𝜁𝜁0) 
for all Markov controls 𝑐𝑐 and all 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷. Moreover, if for each 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷 we have found 𝑐𝑐∗(𝜁𝜁0) such that, 
𝑒𝑒𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝐻𝐻�𝑐𝑐∗(𝜁𝜁0)� + 𝒜𝒜𝜑𝜑𝐻𝐻(𝜁𝜁0) = 0 
and, 
�𝜑𝜑𝐻𝐻,𝑐𝑐∗(𝜁𝜁(𝜏𝜏∗)); 𝜏𝜏∗𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝜏𝜏∗ ≤ 𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷� 
is uniformly ℙ𝜁𝜁0 −integrable for all 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷. Then, 𝑐𝑐∗ = 𝑐𝑐∗(𝜁𝜁) is a Markov control such that, 
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𝜑𝜑𝐻𝐻(𝜁𝜁0) = 𝐽𝐽𝑐𝑐∗(𝜁𝜁0) 
and hence if 𝑐𝑐∗ is admissible then 𝑐𝑐∗ must be an optimal control and 𝜑𝜑𝐻𝐻(𝜁𝜁0) = 𝜓𝜓𝐻𝐻(𝜁𝜁0), which appears in 
Theorem 1. 
Proof. A canonical application of the Verification Theorem of HJB Equation (see, Øksendal, 2003) 
shows the desired assertion. ■ 
Some papers such as Karatzas and Wang (2000), Jeanblanc et al. (2004), and also the textbook of 
Øksendal and Sulem (2005) study utility maximization with discretionary stopping. Instead of 
deriving the optimal stopping time and the optimal controls simultaneously, Theorems 1 and 2 
establish optimal consumption for any given stopping time based upon our Computation 
Algorithm defined in Section 2. In other words, the dynamic sequential game structure between the 
representative household and the self-interested politician will naturally make the corresponding 
computation of the optimal controls much easier. And this would be regarded as a byproduct of 
the dynamic sequential game discussed here. Moreover, it would be interesting to notice that 
optimal controls indeed interact with each other when the economic agents are faced with various 
types of decisions, i.e., optimal stopping time and optimal consumption appear in Theorems 1 and 
2 can be regarded as totally different control variables in some sense. Thus, in contrast to the 
traditional consumption theory, Theorems 1 and 2 show us that optimal consumption will 
endogenously affect the underlying minimum-time needed to economic maturity on the one hand, 
and on the other hand, the minimum-time needed to economic maturity will in turn constraint the 
choice of optimal consumption behavior as a stochastic boundary condition in the corresponding 
optimization problem facing the representative household. And this would be interpreted as the 
new characteristic of Theorems 1 and 2 when compared to existing papers focusing on optimal 
consumption theory. 
Thus, in what follows, we substitute 𝑐𝑐∗ into (9) and we will use 𝒜𝒜𝑐𝑐∗𝒜𝒜(𝜁𝜁0) instead of 𝒜𝒜𝒜𝒜(𝜁𝜁0) 
for all 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷. And also (8) would be rewritten as follows, 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡) = ���1 − 𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡)��𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾�𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)� − 𝛿𝛿� + 𝜎𝜎2 − 𝑛𝑛�𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡) + �1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊(𝑡𝑡)�𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿�𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)�
− �1 + 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡)�𝑐𝑐∗(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 − 𝜎𝜎𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡)                                                                                             (10) 
Now, the optimization problem facing the self-interested politician can be expressed as follows, 
Problem 2. Here, we particularly consider the taxation-revenue consumption per capita for the 
politician. That is, the self-interested politician faces the following optimization problem, 
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max
𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡),𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊 (𝑡𝑡),𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡) 𝐽𝐽(𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾 ,𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊 ,𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶)(𝜁𝜁0)
∶= 𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠 �� 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠)𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃 �𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡)�𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾�𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)� − 𝛿𝛿�𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡), 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊(𝑡𝑡)𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿�𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)�, 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡)𝑐𝑐∗(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏∗
𝑠𝑠
+ 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃,𝜏𝜏∗(𝜁𝜁0)𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏∗<∞}� 
subject to (10) with 𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠  denoting the expectation operator depending on ℱ𝑠𝑠  and 𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃(∙,∙,∙) the 
smooth and increasing instantaneous utility function. Indeed, the specification of 𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃  can efficiently 
reflect the type of politician in the sense of preference, i.e., risk-aversion politician, risk-neutral 
politician, and risk-preference politician. 
So, quite similar to Theorems 1 and 2, we obtain, 
Theorem 3 (Necessity). Define, 
𝜓𝜓𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁0) = sup�𝐽𝐽(𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾 ,𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊 ,𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶)(𝜁𝜁0); 𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾 = 𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝜁𝜁)  , 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊 = 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊(𝜁𝜁),  𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶 = 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶(𝜁𝜁)𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑑𝑑𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠} 
Suppose that 𝜓𝜓𝑃𝑃 ∈ 𝐶𝐶2(𝐷𝐷) ∩ 𝐶𝐶(𝐷𝐷�) satisfies, 
𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠 �� �𝒜𝒜
𝑐𝑐∗𝜓𝜓𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁(𝑡𝑡))�𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏∗
𝑠𝑠
+ �𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃,𝜏𝜏∗(𝜁𝜁0)𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏∗<∞}�� < ∞ 
for all bounded stopping times 𝜏𝜏∗ ≤ 𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷 . Moreover, suppose that an optimal Markov control (𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾∗ , 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊∗ , 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶∗) 
exists and that 𝜕𝜕𝐷𝐷 is regular in the sense of Definition 6 for 𝜁𝜁(𝑡𝑡). Then, sup
𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾 ,𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊 ,𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶�𝑒𝑒𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃(𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾(𝐾𝐾, 𝐿𝐿) − 𝛿𝛿)𝑑𝑑0, 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿(𝐾𝐾, 𝐿𝐿), 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐∗) + 𝒜𝒜𝑐𝑐∗𝜓𝜓𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁0)� = 0 
for all 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷, and, 
𝜓𝜓𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁0) = 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃,𝜏𝜏∗(𝜁𝜁0)                                                                       (11) 
for all 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝜕𝜕𝐷𝐷. In other words, the optimal control (𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾∗ , 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊∗ , 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶∗) fulfills, 
𝑒𝑒𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃(𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾∗ (𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾(𝐾𝐾, 𝐿𝐿) − 𝛿𝛿)𝑑𝑑0, 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿(𝐾𝐾, 𝐿𝐿), 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶∗𝑐𝑐∗) + 𝒜𝒜𝑐𝑐∗𝐽𝐽�𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾∗ ,𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊∗ ,𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶∗ �(𝜁𝜁0) = 0 
for all 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷. 
And also, 
Theorem 4 (Sufficiency). Let 𝜑𝜑𝑃𝑃 be a function in 𝐶𝐶2(𝐷𝐷) ∩ 𝐶𝐶(𝐷𝐷�) such that for all (𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾 , 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊 , 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶), 
𝑒𝑒𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃(𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾(𝐾𝐾, 𝐿𝐿) − 𝛿𝛿)𝑑𝑑0, 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿(𝐾𝐾, 𝐿𝐿), 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐∗) + 𝒜𝒜𝑐𝑐∗𝜑𝜑𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁0) ≤ 0 
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for all 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷 with boundary values, lim
𝑡𝑡→𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷
𝜑𝜑𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁(𝑡𝑡)) = 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃,𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷 (𝜁𝜁0)𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷<∞} 
a.s. ℙ𝜁𝜁0 , and such that, {𝜑𝜑𝑃𝑃−(𝜁𝜁(𝜏𝜏∗)); 𝜏𝜏∗𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝜏𝜏∗ ≤ 𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷} 
is uniformly ℙ𝜁𝜁0 −integrable for all Markov controls (𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾 , 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊 , 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶) and all 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷. Then, 
𝜑𝜑𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁0) ≥ 𝐽𝐽(𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾 ,𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊 ,𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶)(𝜁𝜁0) 
for all Markov controls (𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾 , 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊 , 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶) and all 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷. Moreover, if for each 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷 we have found that 
�𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾
∗ (𝜁𝜁0), 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊∗ (𝜁𝜁0), 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶∗(𝜁𝜁0)� such that, 
𝑒𝑒𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃�𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾
∗ (𝜁𝜁0)(𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾(𝐾𝐾, 𝐿𝐿) − 𝛿𝛿)𝑑𝑑0, 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊∗ (𝜁𝜁0)𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿(𝐾𝐾, 𝐿𝐿), 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶∗(𝜁𝜁0)𝑐𝑐∗(𝜁𝜁0)� + 𝒜𝒜𝑐𝑐∗𝜑𝜑𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁0) = 0 
and, 
�𝜑𝜑𝑃𝑃,�𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾∗ ,𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊∗ ,𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶∗ �(𝜁𝜁(𝜏𝜏∗)); 𝜏𝜏∗𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝜏𝜏∗ ≤ 𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷� 
is uniformly ℙ𝜁𝜁0 − integrable for all 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷 . Then, (𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾∗ , 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊∗ , 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶∗) = �𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾∗ (𝜁𝜁), 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊∗ (𝜁𝜁), 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶∗(𝜁𝜁)�  is a Markov 
control such that, 
𝜑𝜑𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁0) = 𝐽𝐽�𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾∗ ,𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊∗ ,𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶∗ �(𝜁𝜁0) 
and hence if (𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾∗ , 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊∗ , 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶∗) is admissible then (𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾∗ , 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊∗ , 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶∗) must be an optimal control and 𝜑𝜑𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁0) = 𝜓𝜓𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁0), 
which appears in Theorem 3. 
Many existing literatures (e.g., Chamley, 1986; Jones et al., 1993; Phelan and Stacchetti, 2001; 
Kocherlakota, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2011, and among others) focusing on taxation theory build up 
discrete-time models with exogenously prescribed time horizon. And some seminal papers (see, 
Chamley, 1986; Jones et al., 1993; Acemoglu et al., 2011) would heavily depend on the existence of 
the long-run steady state of the economy while Theorems 3 and 4 holding along the whole path of 
capital accumulation with the tax rates exhibiting Markov properties. And also the time horizon of 
the planning problem is endogenously determined in our model. That is to say, Theorems 3 and 4 
show us formulas characterizing the taxation rates under political-economy constraint and also for 
very general preference functions, technology functions and endogenous time horizon. Generally, 
economic intuition will lead us to investigate how tax rates would affect the equilibrium 
minimum-time needed to economic maturity. In other words, we are usually inclined to focus on 
the policy effect of the government imposed on the equilibrium minimum-time needed to economic 
maturity. The results presented in Theorems 3 and 4, however, show us the inverse effect, i.e., the 
equilibrium minimum-time needed to economic maturity, characterized via a stochastic stopping 
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time, as a stochastic boundary condition will also affect the equilibrium (in the sense of sub-game 
perfect) choice of tax rates of the self-interested politician. And hence such kind of interaction 
would shed some new insights into taxation theory from the viewpoint of economic development. 
Hence, in what follows, we use the characteristic operator 𝒜𝒜𝑐𝑐∗,�𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾∗ ,𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊∗ ,𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶∗ �𝒜𝒜(𝜁𝜁0)  instead of 
𝒜𝒜𝑐𝑐
∗
𝒜𝒜(𝜁𝜁0) for all 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷. Also, inserting (𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾∗ , 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊∗ , 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶∗) into (10) produces, 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡) = ���1 − 𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾∗ (𝑡𝑡)��𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾�𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)� − 𝛿𝛿� + 𝜎𝜎2 − 𝑛𝑛�𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡) + �1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊∗ (𝑡𝑡)�𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿�𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)�
− �1 + 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶∗(𝑡𝑡)�𝑐𝑐∗(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 − 𝜎𝜎𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡)                                                                                             (12) 
Thus, we can give, 
Problem 3. Let 𝒯𝒯 denote the set of all ℱ −stopping times 𝜏𝜏 ≤ 𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷. Consider the following problem 
facing the self-interested politician, 
𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃,𝜏𝜏∗(𝜁𝜁0)𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏∗<∞}
∶= sup
𝜏𝜏∈𝒯𝒯
𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠 �𝑒𝑒
−𝜌𝜌(𝜏𝜏−𝑠𝑠)𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃 �𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾∗ (𝜏𝜏)�𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾�𝐾𝐾(𝜏𝜏),𝐿𝐿(𝜏𝜏)�
− 𝛿𝛿�𝑑𝑑(𝜏𝜏), 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊∗ (𝜏𝜏)𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿�𝐾𝐾(𝜏𝜏),𝐿𝐿(𝜏𝜏)�, 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶∗(𝜏𝜏)𝑐𝑐∗(𝜏𝜏)�𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏<∞}� ∶= sup
𝜏𝜏∈𝒯𝒯
𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠�𝑒𝑒
𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢�𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁(𝜏𝜏))𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏<∞}� 
subject to (12). 
It follows from Problem 3 that we have extended the concept of self-interested politician widely 
used by Acemoglu et al. (2008, 2010, 2011) and Yared (2010), and among others. Since the major 
issue of the present exploration is to compute the minimum-time needed to economic maturity for 
underdeveloped economies, the strongly self-interested politician rather than the representative 
household will determine the optimal stopping time. That is, the corresponding minimum-time 
needed to economic maturity only takes into account the utility or welfare of the self-interested 
politician. Indeed, this specification reflects certain type of political institutional arrangement of 
planning economies in reality. In addition, it is easily seen that the specification in Problem 3 is 
totally different from that in Dai (2012), where there is a benevolent government in the underlying 
economy. And it is insisted that such kind of difference indeed reflects different institutional 
arrangements in reality. For example, in many planning economies, it is the politician’s or the 
government’s interests instead of the households’ interests that will determine the long-run 
economic development policy, i.e., the minimum-time needed to economic maturity. Obviously, 
such kind of institutional arrangement will induce an incentive structure among the economic 
agents leading to very poor economic performance, especially in the long run. Undoubtedly, both 
Dai (2012) and Problem 3 just consider special or extreme cases. Nevertheless, what’s the 
corresponding lesson? For underdeveloped economies, in order to promote long-run and 
sustainable economic development, good institutions such as democratic institutions and 
market-economy institutions in Western world should be established first with the purpose of 
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endogenously producing efficient incentive structure in the economy. In other words, the 
corresponding political and economic institutions should play a quite positive role in increasing the 
encompassing interests (see, Olson, 2000) between the politician and the household. 
We then obtain by solving Problem 3, 
Theorem 5 (Sequential-Equilibrium Minimum-Time Needed to Economic Maturity: Existence). 
a) Suppose that we can find a function 𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃 :𝐷𝐷� → ℝ such that, 
(i) 𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃 ∈ 𝐶𝐶1(𝐷𝐷) ∩ 𝐶𝐶(𝐷𝐷�) 
(ii) 𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃 ≥ 𝑒𝑒𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢�𝑃𝑃 on 𝐷𝐷 and lim𝑡𝑡→𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷 𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁(𝑡𝑡)) = 𝑒𝑒𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢�𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁(𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷))𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷<∞} a.s. ℙ𝜁𝜁0  
Define 𝐺𝐺 ∶= {𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷;  𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁0) > 𝑒𝑒𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢�𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁0)} and suppose 𝜁𝜁(𝑡𝑡) spends 0 time on 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺 a.s. ℙ𝜁𝜁0 , i.e., 
(iii) 𝔼𝔼𝜁𝜁0�∫ 𝜒𝜒𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺 (𝜁𝜁(𝑡𝑡))𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠 � = 0 for all 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷, and suppose that, 
(iv) 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺 is a Lipschitz surface. 
Moreover, suppose the following conditions: 
(v) 𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃 ∈ 𝐶𝐶2(𝐷𝐷 ∖ 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺) and the second order derivatives of 𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃  are locally bounded near 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺 
(vi) 𝒜𝒜𝑐𝑐∗,�𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾∗ ,𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊∗ ,𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶∗ �𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃 ≤ 0 on 𝐷𝐷 ∖ 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺 
Then, 𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁0) ≥ 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃,𝜏𝜏∗(𝜁𝜁0) for all 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷 
b) Suppose, in addition to the above conditions, that, 
(vii) 𝒜𝒜𝑐𝑐∗,�𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾∗ ,𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊∗ ,𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶∗ �𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃 = 0 on 𝐺𝐺 
(viii) 𝜏𝜏𝐺𝐺 ∶= inf{𝑡𝑡 > 𝑠𝑠;  𝜁𝜁(𝑡𝑡) ∉ 𝐺𝐺} < ∞ a.s. ℙ𝜁𝜁0  for 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷, and 
(ix) The family {𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃−(𝜁𝜁(𝜏𝜏));  𝜏𝜏 ≤ 𝜏𝜏𝐺𝐺 , 𝜏𝜏 ∈ 𝒯𝒯} is uniformly integrable w.r.t. ℙ𝜁𝜁0  for all 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷 
Then, 𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁0) = 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃,𝜏𝜏∗(𝜁𝜁0) = sup
𝜏𝜏∈𝒯𝒯
𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠[𝑒𝑒𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢�𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁(𝜏𝜏))] for all 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷 
and, 
𝜏𝜏∗ = 𝜏𝜏𝐺𝐺  
is an optimal stopping time for this problem. 
Proof. A direct application of the Variational Inequalities for optimal stopping (see, Øksendal, 
2003) produces the required assertion. ■ 
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While one may notice certain similarity of the present approach to those literatures studying 
endogenous lifetime or endogenous longevity in growth models (see, Chakraborty, 2004; de la 
Croix and Ponthiere, 2010, and among others), there exist obvious differences especially when 
referring to economic intuitions and economic implications behind the formal models. For example, 
existing studies mainly focus on OLG models and health-investment behaviors while the current 
exploration emphasizing issues of macroeconomic development, i.e., formal characterization of 
economic maturity for underdeveloped economies and the corresponding characteristics of their 
optimal paths of capital accumulation. Furthermore, it is easily seen that the maximum sustainable 
capital-labor ratio corresponding to the state of economic maturity as well as the minimum time 
needed to economic maturity is endogenously determined by using stochastic optimal stopping 
theory that is widely applied in mathematical finance (see, Øksendal and Sulem (2005) and 
references therein). As is well known, in Kurz’s (1965) study, the targets or the maximum 
sustainable level of terminal path capital-labor ratios are exogenously specified, and the 
corresponding minimum time problem is expressed as: for any given initial capital-labor ratios, to 
chose strategies so that the prescribed targets can be reached as soon as possible. The major 
innovation of the present approach, therefore, is that we endogenously determine the terminal path, 
the minimum time and also take the economic-welfare considerations of the strongly self-interested 
politician into account in solving the minimum-time problem. Last but not least, Theorem 5 indeed 
provides us with a general and complete characterization of the minimum-time needed to 
economic maturity when compared to the corresponding result in Dai (2012). And most 
importantly, this kind of generalization will sufficiently capture the economic effects of preferences 
and technologies on the minimum-time needed to economic maturity, which hence implies that 
Theorem 5 would be of independent interest. 
Corollary 1. In principle, the sequential-equilibrium minimum-time needed to economic maturity 𝜏𝜏∗ can be 
further computed by the following equality, 
𝜓𝜓𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁0) = 𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁0) 
Proof. Combining (11) with Theorem 5 produces the desired result. ■ 
It is particularly worth emphasizing that Corollary 1 as well as the corollaries in Section 4 is one 
major innovation of the model because these corollaries provide simple conditions under which the 
corresponding minimum-time needed to economic maturity can be explicitly computed as is 
shown in Section 5. In addition to that, one may easily notice that the equilibrium minimum-time 
needed to economic maturity in Corollary 1 clearly reflects the reasonable combination of the 
optimal stopping theory and the stochastic dynamic programming method. 
Case 2. Suppose that there is a semi-strongly self-interested politician in the economy. 
Case 3. Suppose that there is a weakly self-interested politician in the economy. 
Noting that the discussions corresponding to Cases 2 and 3 are quite similar to that of Case 1, we 
hence take them omitted and leave them to the interested readers. 
4. Cooperative-Equilibrium Economic Maturity 
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In the present section, we will introduce a new approach to economic maturity, i.e., cooperative- 
equilibrium economic maturity. Kaitala and Pohjola (1990), and Leong and Huang (2010) study the 
differential cooperative game between the firm and the government in deterministic and stochastic 
environments, respectively. However, we will investigate the differential cooperative game 
between the representative household and the self-interested politician with the time horizon 
endogenously determined. As a result, our following theorems are new relative to those of Kaitala 
and Pohjola (1990), and Leong and Huang (2010). Additionally, the following results will be much 
more complicated owing to the general preference and technology functions we employed here. 
We will first introduce Markov feedback Nash equilibrium solution, and then cooperative 
equilibrium which fulfills the following requirements: individual rationality, group rationality, 
sub-game consistency and also Pareto-optimality. Moreover, we derive the payoff distribution 
procedure (PDP) of the cooperative game based upon the sub-game consistent imputation and 
provided that the players agree to act according to all agreed upon Pareto-optimal principle, for 
example, Nash bargaining solution and Shapley value. In particular, we give, 
Assumption 2. Here, and throughout the current paper, it is assumed that payoffs\utilities are transferable 
across players, i.e., the representative household and the self-interested politician, and over time. 
Case 1. Suppose that there is a strongly self-interested politician in the economy. 
Theorem 6 (Markov Feedback Nash Equilibrium Solution). We denote by 𝛤𝛤(𝑑𝑑0, ?̂?𝜏 − 𝑠𝑠)  the 
differential game between the representative household and the self-interested politician, and hence a set of 
feedback strategies �?̂?𝑐(𝑠𝑠)(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑); ?̂?𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝑠𝑠)(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑), ?̂?𝜏𝑊𝑊(𝑠𝑠)(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑), ?̂?𝜏𝐶𝐶(𝑠𝑠)(𝑡𝑡, 𝑑𝑑)� provides a Nash equilibrium solution to the 
game 𝛤𝛤(𝑑𝑑0, ?̂?𝜏 − 𝑠𝑠) , if there exist continuously differentiable functions, 𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑): [𝑠𝑠, ?̂?𝜏] × ℝ+ → ℝ , 
𝑠𝑠 ∈ {𝐻𝐻,𝑃𝑃}, satisfying the following Fleming-Bellman-Isaacs partial differential equations, 
−𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡
(𝑠𝑠)𝐻𝐻(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑) − 12𝜎𝜎2𝑑𝑑2𝑉𝑉𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑠𝑠)𝐻𝐻(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑)= max
𝑐𝑐≥0 �𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠)𝑢𝑢𝐻𝐻(𝑐𝑐)+ 𝑉𝑉𝑑𝑑(𝑠𝑠)𝐻𝐻(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑){[(1 − ?̂?𝜏𝐾𝐾)(𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾(𝐾𝐾, 𝐿𝐿) − 𝛿𝛿) + 𝜎𝜎2 − 𝑛𝑛]𝑑𝑑 + (1 − ?̂?𝜏𝑊𝑊)𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿(𝐾𝐾, 𝐿𝐿) − (1 + ?̂?𝜏𝐶𝐶)𝑐𝑐}� 
and, 
−𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡
(𝑠𝑠)𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑) − 12𝜎𝜎2𝑑𝑑2𝑉𝑉𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑠𝑠)𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑)= max
𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾 ,𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊 ,𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶�𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠)𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃(𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾(𝐾𝐾, 𝐿𝐿) − 𝛿𝛿)𝑑𝑑, 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿(𝐾𝐾, 𝐿𝐿), 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶?̂?𝑐)+ 𝑉𝑉𝑑𝑑(𝑠𝑠)𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑){[(1 − 𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾)(𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾(𝐾𝐾, 𝐿𝐿) − 𝛿𝛿) + 𝜎𝜎2 − 𝑛𝑛]𝑑𝑑 + (1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊)𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿(𝐾𝐾, 𝐿𝐿) − (1 + 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶)?̂?𝑐}� 
with the following boundary conditions, 
𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠)𝐻𝐻�?̂?𝜏,𝑑𝑑(?̂?𝜏)� = 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝜏𝜏�−𝑠𝑠)𝑢𝑢𝐻𝐻�𝑐𝑐(?̂?𝜏)� 
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𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠)𝑃𝑃�?̂?𝜏,𝑑𝑑(?̂?𝜏)� = 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃,𝜏𝜏�(𝜁𝜁0)                                                                            (13) 
As argued by Fischer (1980), the problem of dynamic inconsistency can arise if the policy maker’s 
utility function differs from that of the representative household. That is, there will be no dynamic 
inconsistency if the politician and the representative household face exactly the same optimization 
problem except for the variables they control. Noting that the Markov feedback Nash equilibrium 
�?̂?𝑐(𝑠𝑠)(𝑡𝑡, 𝑑𝑑); ?̂?𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝑠𝑠)(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑), ?̂?𝜏𝑊𝑊(𝑠𝑠)(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑), ?̂?𝜏𝐶𝐶(𝑠𝑠)(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑)� given in Theorem 6 is Markovian in the sense that they are 
functions of current time 𝑡𝑡 and current state 𝑑𝑑 = 𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡), and thus independent of past values of 
state. This implies that the optimal solutions do not depend on the choice of the starting time of the 
optimal path, and accordingly the problem of dynamic inconsistency disappears even though the 
self-interested politician and the representative household face totally different optimization 
problems in Theorem 6. Moreover, besides the Feedback-Nash equilibrium solution established in 
Theorem 6, many literatures such as Pohjola (1983), and Başar et al. (1985) also studied Feedback- 
Stackelberg solution (see, Simaan and Cruz, 1973) in a differential game model of capitalism (e.g., 
Lancaster, 1973; Hoel, 1978). It is therefore asserted that Theorem 6 can also be extended to derive 
the corresponding Feedback-Stackelberg solution and one, if motivated, may also investigate the 
difference and similarity between the two kinds of solution in the present framework.  
Now, inserting the feedback strategies derived in Theorem 6 into (8) gives rise to, 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡) = ���1 − ?̂?𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�� �𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾�𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)� − 𝛿𝛿� + 𝜎𝜎2 − 𝑛𝑛� 𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡) + �1 − ?̂?𝜏𝑊𝑊(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)��𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿�𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)�
− �1 + ?̂?𝜏𝐶𝐶(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡, 𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�� ?̂?𝑐(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�� 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
− 𝜎𝜎𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡)                                                                                                                                         (14) 
Provided the Markov feedback Nash equilibrium �?̂?𝑐(𝑠𝑠)(𝑡𝑡, 𝑑𝑑); ?̂?𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝑠𝑠)(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑), ?̂?𝜏𝑊𝑊(𝑠𝑠)(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑), ?̂?𝜏𝐶𝐶(𝑠𝑠)(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑)� given in 
Theorem 6, then the corresponding stopping time ?̂?𝜏 given in Theorem 6 is a solution to the 
following problem, 
Problem 4. Similar to Problem 3, let 𝒯𝒯 denote the set of all ℱ −stopping times 𝜏𝜏 ≤ 𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷. Then the 
optimal stopping problem facing the strongly self-interested politician reads as follows, 
𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃,𝜏𝜏�(𝜁𝜁0)𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏�<∞}
∶= sup
𝜏𝜏∈𝒯𝒯
𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠 �𝑒𝑒
−𝜌𝜌(𝜏𝜏−𝑠𝑠)𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃 �?̂?𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝑠𝑠)�𝜏𝜏,𝑑𝑑(𝜏𝜏)��𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾�𝐾𝐾(𝜏𝜏),𝐿𝐿(𝜏𝜏)�
− 𝛿𝛿�𝑑𝑑(𝜏𝜏), ?̂?𝜏𝑊𝑊(𝑠𝑠)�𝜏𝜏,𝑑𝑑(𝜏𝜏)�𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿�𝐾𝐾(𝜏𝜏),𝐿𝐿(𝜏𝜏)�, ?̂?𝜏𝐶𝐶(𝑠𝑠)�𝜏𝜏,𝑑𝑑(𝜏𝜏)�?̂?𝑐(𝑠𝑠)�𝜏𝜏,𝑑𝑑(𝜏𝜏)�� 𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏<∞}�
∶= sup
𝜏𝜏∈𝒯𝒯
𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠�𝑒𝑒
𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢�𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁(𝜏𝜏))𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏<∞}� 
subject to (14). 
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Solving Problem 4 establishes the following theorem, which is quite similar to Theorem 5. 
Theorem 7 (Markov-Equilibrium Minimum-Time Needed to Economic Maturity: Existence). 
a) Suppose that we can find a function 𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃 :𝐷𝐷� → ℝ such that, 
(i) 𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃 ∈ 𝐶𝐶1(𝐷𝐷) ∩ 𝐶𝐶(𝐷𝐷�) 
(ii) 𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃 ≥ 𝑒𝑒𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢�𝑃𝑃 on 𝐷𝐷 and lim𝑡𝑡→𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷 𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁(𝑡𝑡)) = 𝑒𝑒𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢�𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁(𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷))𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷<∞} a.s. ℙ𝜁𝜁0  
Define 𝐺𝐺 ∶= {𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷;  𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁0) > 𝑒𝑒𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢�𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁0)} and suppose 𝜁𝜁(𝑡𝑡) spends 0 time on 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺 a.s. ℙ𝜁𝜁0 , i.e., 
(iii) 𝔼𝔼𝜁𝜁0�∫ 𝜒𝜒𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺 (𝜁𝜁(𝑡𝑡))𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠 � = 0 for all 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷, and suppose that, 
(iv) 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺 is a Lipschitz surface. 
Moreover, suppose the following conditions: 
(v) 𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃 ∈ 𝐶𝐶2(𝐷𝐷 ∖ 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺) and the second order derivatives of 𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃  are locally bounded near 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺 
(vi) 𝒜𝒜𝑐𝑐̂,(𝜏𝜏�𝐾𝐾 ,𝜏𝜏�𝑊𝑊 ,𝜏𝜏�𝐶𝐶)𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃 ≤ 0 on 𝐷𝐷 ∖ 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺 
Then, 𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁0) ≥ 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃,𝜏𝜏�(𝜁𝜁0) for all 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷 
b) Suppose, in addition to the above conditions, that, 
(vii) 𝒜𝒜𝑐𝑐̂,(𝜏𝜏�𝐾𝐾 ,𝜏𝜏�𝑊𝑊 ,𝜏𝜏�𝐶𝐶)𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃 = 0 on 𝐺𝐺 
(viii) 𝜏𝜏𝐺𝐺 ∶= inf{𝑡𝑡 > 𝑠𝑠;  𝜁𝜁(𝑡𝑡) ∉ 𝐺𝐺} < ∞ a.s. ℙ𝜁𝜁0  for 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷, and 
(ix) The family {𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃−(𝜁𝜁(𝜏𝜏));  𝜏𝜏 ≤ 𝜏𝜏𝐺𝐺 , 𝜏𝜏 ∈ 𝒯𝒯} is uniformly integrable w.r.t. ℙ𝜁𝜁0  for all 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷 
Then, 𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁0) = 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃,𝜏𝜏�(𝜁𝜁0) = sup
𝜏𝜏∈𝒯𝒯
𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠[𝑒𝑒𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢�𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁(𝜏𝜏))] for all 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷 
and, 
?̂?𝜏 = 𝜏𝜏𝐺𝐺  
is an optimal stopping time for this problem. 
Corollary 2. In principle, the Markov-equilibrium minimum-time needed to economic maturity ?̂?𝜏 can be 
further computed by the following equality, 
𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠)𝑃𝑃�?̂?𝜏,𝑑𝑑(?̂?𝜏)� = 𝒜𝒜𝑃𝑃(𝜁𝜁0) 
Proof. Combining (13) with Theorem 7 produces the desired result. ■ 
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Generally, the set of sub-game perfect sequential equilibrium is a subset of that of Nash 
equilibrium. For example, in many interesting games, there exist multiple Nash equilibra while the 
uniqueness of the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium can be ensured. Therefore, the Markov- 
equilibrium minimum time in Theorem 7 may rightly coincide with the sequential equilibrium 
minimum time in Theorem 5 on the one hand, while on the other hand, the Markov equilibrium 
minimum time may be also a relatively new concept under certain specifications of preference and 
technology in the model. 
Now, we focus on the following cooperative stochastic differential game. First, we introduce, 
Problem 5. Based upon Assumption 2, and suppose that the representative household and the self- 
interested politician agree to maximize the sum of their expected payoffs, i.e., 
max
𝑐𝑐 ,𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾 ,𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊 ,𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶 𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠 �� 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠) �𝑢𝑢𝐻𝐻(𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡))𝜏𝜏∗∗𝑠𝑠+ 𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃 �𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡)�𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾�𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)� − 𝛿𝛿�𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡), 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊(𝑡𝑡)𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿�𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)�, 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡)𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡)�� 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
+ 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛 ,𝜏𝜏∗∗(𝜁𝜁0)𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏∗∗<∞}� 
subject to (8). 
In particular, both 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛 ,𝜏𝜏∗∗(𝜁𝜁0) and 𝜏𝜏∗∗ are determined by the following problem, 
Problem 6. When there is cooperation between the representative household and the strongly self- 
interested politician, then the minimum-time needed to economic maturity 𝜏𝜏∗∗ is determined by 
solving the following problem, 
𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛 ,𝜏𝜏∗∗(𝜁𝜁0)𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏∗∗<∞}
∶= sup
𝜏𝜏∈𝒯𝒯
𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠 �𝑒𝑒
−𝜌𝜌(𝜏𝜏−𝑠𝑠) �𝑢𝑢𝐻𝐻 �𝑐𝑐∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝜏𝜏,𝑑𝑑(𝜏𝜏)��+ 𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃 �𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝜏𝜏,𝑑𝑑(𝜏𝜏)��𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾�𝐾𝐾(𝜏𝜏),𝐿𝐿(𝜏𝜏)�
− 𝛿𝛿�𝑑𝑑(𝜏𝜏), 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝜏𝜏, 𝑑𝑑(𝜏𝜏)�𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿�𝐾𝐾(𝜏𝜏),𝐿𝐿(𝜏𝜏)�, 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝜏𝜏,𝑑𝑑(𝜏𝜏)�𝑐𝑐∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝜏𝜏,𝑑𝑑(𝜏𝜏)��� 𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏<∞}�
∶= sup
𝜏𝜏∈𝒯𝒯
𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠�𝑒𝑒
𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢�𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛 (𝜁𝜁(𝜏𝜏))𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏<∞}� 
subject to, 
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𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡) = ���1 − 𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�� �𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾�𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)� − 𝛿𝛿� + 𝜎𝜎2 − 𝑛𝑛� 𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡) + �1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�� 𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿�𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)�
− �1 + 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�� 𝑐𝑐∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�� 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
− 𝜎𝜎𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡)                                                                                                                                         (15) 
with 𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾
∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�, 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�, 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡, 𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)� and 𝑐𝑐∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)� determined by Problem 5. 
By solving Problem 5, we derive, 
Theorem 8. We denote by 𝛤𝛤𝐶𝐶(𝑑𝑑0, 𝜏𝜏∗∗ − 𝑠𝑠) the cooperative differential game between the representative 
household and the strongly self-interested politician, and consequently a set of Markov feedback strategies 
�𝑐𝑐∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�; 𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�, 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡, 𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�, 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�� provides a cooperative equilibrium solution to 
the cooperative game 𝛤𝛤𝐶𝐶(𝑑𝑑0, 𝜏𝜏∗∗ − 𝑠𝑠) , if there exist continuously differentiable functions 
𝑊𝑊(𝑠𝑠)(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑): [𝑠𝑠, 𝜏𝜏∗∗] × ℝ+ → ℝ , 𝑠𝑠 ∈ {𝐻𝐻,𝑃𝑃} , satisfying the following Fleming-Bellman-Isaacs partial 
differential equation, 
−𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡
(𝑠𝑠)(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑) − 12𝜎𝜎2𝑑𝑑2𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑠𝑠)(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑)= max
𝑐𝑐 ,𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾 ,𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊 ,𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶�𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠)[𝑢𝑢𝐻𝐻(𝑐𝑐) + 𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃(𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾(𝐾𝐾, 𝐿𝐿) − 𝛿𝛿)𝑑𝑑, 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿(𝐾𝐾, 𝐿𝐿), 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐)]+ 𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑(𝑠𝑠)(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑){[(1 − 𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾)(𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾(𝐾𝐾, 𝐿𝐿) − 𝛿𝛿) + 𝜎𝜎2 − 𝑛𝑛]𝑑𝑑 + (1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊)𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿(𝐾𝐾, 𝐿𝐿) − (1 + 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶)𝑐𝑐}� 
with the following boundary condition, 
𝑊𝑊(𝑠𝑠)�𝜏𝜏∗∗, 𝑑𝑑(𝜏𝜏∗∗)� = 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛 ,𝜏𝜏∗∗(𝜁𝜁0)                                                      (16) 
It will be shown below that the boundary condition in (16) is of great importance in identifying 
the cooperative equilibrium minimum-time needed to economic maturity. As you may notice, 
Theorem 8 is established relying on Assumption 2, i.e., payoffs\utilities are transferable across 
players and over time. Nonetheless, technically, Theorem 8 can also be extended to study the case 
of nontransferable utilities\payoffs (see, Yeung and Petrosyan, 2006) across players and over time. 
For example, here we may consider the weighted social welfare function (see, Harsanyi, 1955, and 
among others) regarding the representative household and the self-interested politician. And one 
may further interpret such kind of specification from the following viewpoints: first, the choice of 
the social welfare function will to some extent reflect the social institution or social structure of the 
underlying economy (see, for example, Akerlof (1997) and references therein), for instance, the 
representative household and the self-interested politician share asymmetric social status, and 
therefore asymmetric bargaining power in the game of resource allocation; second, here we 
specifically employ the methodology that utility is comparable among the economic individuals 
(e.g., Harsanyi, 1955; Sen, 1970; Kalai, 1977, and among others). To sum up, Theorem 8 has 
provided us with a useful starting point in this direction for future exploration. 
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In order to make sure that 𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾
∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�, 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�, 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)� and 𝑐𝑐∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡, 𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)� derived 
in Theorem 8 indeed provides us with a cooperative equilibrium solution, we need to introduce the 
following definitions and theorems, 
Definition 7 (Group Rationality). If it is confirmed that 𝑊𝑊(𝑠𝑠)(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)) > ∑ 𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡))𝑠𝑠∈{𝐻𝐻,𝑃𝑃}  along 
the trajectory {𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)}𝑡𝑡=𝑠𝑠𝜏𝜏∗∗  that is given by (15), then we claim that the optimal solution 
�𝑐𝑐∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�; 𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�, 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡, 𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�, 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�� satisfies group rationality. 
Chang and Malliaris (1987), by using the Reflection Principle, demonstrated the existence and 
uniqueness of the solution to the classic Solow equation under continuous time uncertainty for the 
class of strictly concave production functions which are continuously differentiable on the non- 
negative real numbers. This class contains all CES functions with elasticity of substitution less than 
unity. Hence, we directly give, 
Assumption 3. Suppose that the solution to the SDE given in (15) exists and it can be expressed as follows, 
𝑑𝑑∗∗(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑑𝑑0 + � ���1 − 𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝜆𝜆, 𝑑𝑑∗∗(𝜆𝜆)�� �𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾�𝐾𝐾(𝜆𝜆),𝐿𝐿(𝜆𝜆)� − 𝛿𝛿� + 𝜎𝜎2 − 𝑛𝑛� 𝑑𝑑∗∗(𝜆𝜆)𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠+ �1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝜆𝜆, 𝑑𝑑∗∗(𝜆𝜆)��𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿�𝐾𝐾(𝜆𝜆), 𝐿𝐿(𝜆𝜆)� − �1 + 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝜆𝜆,𝑑𝑑∗∗(𝜆𝜆)�� 𝑐𝑐∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝜆𝜆,𝑑𝑑∗∗(𝜆𝜆)�� 𝑑𝑑𝜆𝜆
− � 𝜎𝜎𝑑𝑑∗∗(𝜆𝜆)𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵(𝜆𝜆)𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠
                                                                                                                              (17) 
We let 𝛯𝛯𝑡𝑡∗∗ denote the set of reliable values of 𝑑𝑑∗∗(𝑡𝑡) at time 𝑡𝑡 generated by (17). The term 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡∗∗ 
is also used to represent an element in the set 𝛯𝛯𝑡𝑡∗∗ . Let 𝜂𝜂(𝑡𝑡0) ∶= [𝜂𝜂𝐻𝐻(𝑡𝑡0),𝜂𝜂𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡0)]  denote the 
instantaneous payoff of the cooperative game 𝛤𝛤𝐶𝐶(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠∗∗) at time 𝑡𝑡0 ∈ [𝑠𝑠, 𝜏𝜏∗∗] with 𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠∗∗ ∈ 𝛯𝛯𝑠𝑠∗∗. In 
particular, along the cooperative trajectory {𝑑𝑑∗∗(𝑡𝑡)}𝑡𝑡=𝑠𝑠𝜏𝜏∗∗  we put, 
𝜉𝜉(𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗� ∶= 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡0 � � 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝜆𝜆−𝑡𝑡0)𝜂𝜂𝑠𝑠(𝜆𝜆)𝜏𝜏∗∗
𝑡𝑡0 𝑑𝑑𝜆𝜆� 𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡0) = 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗� 
𝜉𝜉(𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡∗∗) ∶= 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡 � � 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝜆𝜆−𝑡𝑡)𝜂𝜂𝑠𝑠(𝜆𝜆)𝜏𝜏∗∗
𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝜆𝜆� 𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡∗∗� 
for 𝑠𝑠 ∈ {𝐻𝐻,𝑃𝑃}, 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗ ∈ 𝛯𝛯𝑡𝑡0∗∗, 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡∗∗ ∈ 𝛯𝛯𝑡𝑡∗∗ and 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝑡𝑡0 ≥ 𝑠𝑠. 
Thus, based upon an agreed-upon optimality principle such as Nash bargaining solution or 
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Shapley value introduced below, the vectors 𝜉𝜉(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗� ∶= �𝜉𝜉(𝑠𝑠)𝐻𝐻�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗�, 𝜉𝜉(𝑠𝑠)𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗�� for 𝑡𝑡0 ≥ 𝑠𝑠, 
are valid imputations if the following conditions are satisfied, 
Definition 8 (Valid Imputation). The vector 𝜉𝜉(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗� is a valid imputation of the differential 
cooperative game 𝛤𝛤𝐶𝐶�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗�, for 𝑡𝑡0 ∈ [𝑠𝑠, 𝜏𝜏∗∗] and 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗ ∈ 𝛯𝛯𝑡𝑡0∗∗, if it satisfies, 
(i) 𝜉𝜉(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗� ∶= �𝜉𝜉(𝑠𝑠)𝐻𝐻�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗�, 𝜉𝜉(𝑠𝑠)𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗�� is a Pareto optimal imputation vector; 
(ii) Individual rationality requirement, i.e., 𝜉𝜉(𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗� ≥ 𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗�, for 𝑠𝑠 ∈ {𝐻𝐻,𝑃𝑃}. 
Moreover, we define, 
𝛾𝛾(𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠�𝑡𝑡0; 𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗� ∶= 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡0 � � 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝜆𝜆−𝑡𝑡0)𝜂𝜂𝑠𝑠(𝜆𝜆)𝜏𝜏∗∗
𝑡𝑡0 𝑑𝑑𝜆𝜆� 𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡0) = 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗� = 𝜉𝜉(𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗� 
and, 
𝛾𝛾(𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡0; 𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡∗∗) ∶= 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡 � � 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝜆𝜆−𝑡𝑡0)𝜂𝜂𝑠𝑠(𝜆𝜆)𝜏𝜏∗∗
𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝜆𝜆� 𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡∗∗� 
for 𝑠𝑠 ∈ {𝐻𝐻,𝑃𝑃} and 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝑡𝑡0 ≥ 𝑠𝑠. Noting that, 
𝛾𝛾(𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡0; 𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡∗∗) ∶= 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡−𝑡𝑡0)𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡 � � 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝜆𝜆−𝑡𝑡)𝜂𝜂𝑠𝑠(𝜆𝜆)𝜏𝜏∗∗
𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝜆𝜆� 𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡∗∗� = 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡−𝑡𝑡0)𝜉𝜉(𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡∗∗)= 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡−𝑡𝑡0)𝛾𝛾(𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡; 𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡∗∗)                                                                                                                     (18) 
for 𝑠𝑠 ∈ {𝐻𝐻,𝑃𝑃} and 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡∗∗ ∈ 𝛯𝛯𝑡𝑡∗∗, we now give, 
Definition 9 (Sub-Game Consistency). The condition in (18) guarantees sub-game consistency of 
the solution imputation throughout the game interval in the sense that the extension of the solution 
policy to a situation with a later starting time and any feasible state brought about by prior optimal 
behaviors would remain optimal. 
Indeed, Definition 9 is directly brought from Yeung and Petrosyan (2006). Furthermore, we can 
get the PDP as follows, 
Theorem 9 (Sub-Game Consistent Solution). An instantaneous payment at time 𝑡𝑡0 ∈ [𝑠𝑠, 𝜏𝜏∗∗] equaling, 
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𝜂𝜂𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡0) = −𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡0(𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗� − 12𝜎𝜎2�𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗�2𝜉𝜉𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗(𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠 �𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗�
− 𝜉𝜉𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗(𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗� ���1 − 𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡0, 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗�� �𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾�𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡0),𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡0)� − 𝛿𝛿� + 𝜎𝜎2 − 𝑛𝑛� 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗+ �1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗�� 𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿�𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡0), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡0)� − �1 + 𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗�� 𝑐𝑐∗∗(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗�� 
for 𝑠𝑠 ∈ {𝐻𝐻,𝑃𝑃} and 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗ ∈ 𝛯𝛯𝑡𝑡0∗∗, and this yields a sub-game consistent solution or the PDP of the cooperative 
game 𝛤𝛤𝐶𝐶�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗�. 
Proof. It is quite similar to the proof of Theorem 5.8.3 of Yeung and Petrosyan (2006), so we take it 
omitted. ■ 
As noted above, one may consider sub-game consistent solutions under specific optimality 
principles. For example, one may use, 
Definition 10 (Nash Bargaining Solution\Shapley Value). In the cooperative game 𝛤𝛤𝐶𝐶(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑0), at 
time 𝑠𝑠 an imputation, 
𝜉𝜉(𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑0) = 𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑0) + 12 �𝑊𝑊(𝑠𝑠)(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑0) − ∑ 𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗 (𝑠𝑠, 𝑑𝑑0)𝑗𝑗∈{𝐻𝐻,𝑃𝑃} �. 
is assigned to player 𝑠𝑠, for 𝑠𝑠 ∈ {𝐻𝐻,𝑃𝑃}; and at time 𝑡𝑡0 ∈ [𝑠𝑠, 𝜏𝜏∗∗], an imputation, 
𝜉𝜉(𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗� = 𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗� + 12 �𝑊𝑊(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗� − ∑ 𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗 �𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗�𝑗𝑗∈{𝐻𝐻,𝑃𝑃} �. 
is assigned to player 𝑠𝑠, for 𝑠𝑠 ∈ {𝐻𝐻,𝑃𝑃} and 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗ ∈ 𝛯𝛯𝑡𝑡0∗∗. 
Here, it is especially worth emphasizing that Nash bargaining solution and Shapley value 
coincide with each other in the present two-player game (see, Yeung and Petrosyan, 2006) while 
they generally showing us different cooperative mechanisms when there are over two players in 
the game. 
Theorem 10 (Sub-Game Consistency of the Nash Bargaining Solution\Shapley Value). It is 
confirmed that the Nash bargaining solution\Shapley value 𝜉𝜉(𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗� given in Definition 10 is a sub- 
game consistent imputation for the present cooperative game 𝛤𝛤𝐶𝐶(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑0) for 𝜏𝜏∗∗ ≥ 𝑡𝑡0 ≥ 𝑠𝑠. 
Proof. Noting that the equilibrium feedback strategies or the stochastic controls in Theorems 6 
and 8 are Markovian in the sense that they depend on current state and current time, one can 
readily observe by comparing the corresponding stochastic Bellman equations in Theorems 6 and 8 
for different values of 𝑡𝑡0 ∈ [𝑠𝑠, ?̂?𝜏] and 𝑡𝑡0 ∈ [𝑠𝑠, 𝜏𝜏∗∗], respectively, that, 
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⎝
⎜
⎛
?̂?𝑐(𝑡𝑡0)�𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡�
?̂?𝜏𝐾𝐾
(𝑡𝑡0)�𝑡𝑡, 𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡�
?̂?𝜏𝑊𝑊
(𝑡𝑡0)�𝑡𝑡, 𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡�
?̂?𝜏𝐶𝐶
(𝑡𝑡0)�𝑡𝑡, 𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡�⎠⎟
⎞ =
⎝
⎜
⎛
?̂?𝑐(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡�
?̂?𝜏𝐾𝐾
(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡�
?̂?𝜏𝑊𝑊
(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡�
?̂?𝜏𝐶𝐶
(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡�⎠⎟
⎞
 
for ?̂?𝜏 ≥ 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝑡𝑡0 ≥ 𝑠𝑠  and 𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡 = 𝑑𝑑�(𝑡𝑡)  the corresponding optimal trajectory of capital-labor ratio 
determined by (14) at time 𝑡𝑡, and also, 
⎝
⎜
⎛
𝑐𝑐∗∗(𝑡𝑡0)(𝑡𝑡, 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡∗∗)
𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾
∗∗(𝑡𝑡0)(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡∗∗)
𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊
∗∗(𝑡𝑡0)(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡∗∗)
𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶
∗∗(𝑡𝑡0)(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡∗∗)⎠⎟
⎞ =
⎝
⎜
⎛
𝑐𝑐∗∗(𝑠𝑠)(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡∗∗)
𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾
∗∗(𝑠𝑠)(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡∗∗)
𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊
∗∗(𝑠𝑠)(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡∗∗)
𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶
∗∗(𝑠𝑠)(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡∗∗)⎠⎟
⎞
 
for 𝜏𝜏∗∗ ≥ 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝑡𝑡0 ≥ 𝑠𝑠 and 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡∗∗ = 𝑑𝑑∗∗(𝑡𝑡) the corresponding optimal trajectory of capital-labor ratio 
determined by (17). Moreover, along the optimal trajectory �𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡�𝑡𝑡=𝑠𝑠𝜏𝜏� , one can obtain, 
𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠)𝐻𝐻�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡0� ∶= 𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠 � � 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝜆𝜆−𝑠𝑠)𝑢𝑢𝐻𝐻 �?̂?𝑐(𝑠𝑠)�𝜆𝜆, 𝑑𝑑�𝜆𝜆�� 𝑑𝑑𝜆𝜆𝜏𝜏�
𝑡𝑡0 + 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝜏𝜏�−𝑠𝑠)𝑢𝑢𝐻𝐻 �?̂?𝑐(𝑠𝑠)�?̂?𝜏,𝑑𝑑�𝜏𝜏���� 𝑑𝑑�(𝑡𝑡0) = 𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡0�
= 𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠 � � 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝜆𝜆−𝑡𝑡0)𝑢𝑢𝐻𝐻 �?̂?𝑐(𝑡𝑡0)�𝜆𝜆,𝑑𝑑�𝜆𝜆�� 𝑑𝑑𝜆𝜆𝜏𝜏�
𝑡𝑡0 + 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝜏𝜏�−𝑡𝑡0)𝑢𝑢𝐻𝐻 �?̂?𝑐(𝑡𝑡0)�?̂?𝜏,𝑑𝑑�𝜏𝜏���� 𝑑𝑑�(𝑡𝑡0) = 𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡0� 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡0−𝑠𝑠)
= 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡0 � � 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝜆𝜆−𝑡𝑡0)𝑢𝑢𝐻𝐻 �?̂?𝑐(𝑡𝑡0)�𝜆𝜆, 𝑑𝑑�𝜆𝜆�� 𝑑𝑑𝜆𝜆𝜏𝜏�
𝑡𝑡0 + 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝜏𝜏�−𝑡𝑡0)𝑢𝑢𝐻𝐻 �?̂?𝑐(𝑡𝑡0)�?̂?𝜏,𝑑𝑑�𝜏𝜏���� 𝑑𝑑�(𝑡𝑡0) = 𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡0� 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡0−𝑠𝑠)
∶= 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡0−𝑠𝑠) 𝑉𝑉(𝑡𝑡0)𝐻𝐻�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡0� 
where 𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠)𝐻𝐻�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡0� measures the expected present value of the representative household’s payoff 
in the time interval [𝑡𝑡0, ?̂?𝜏] when 𝑑𝑑�(𝑡𝑡0) = 𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡0  and when the game starts from time s ≤ 𝑡𝑡0. For the 
self-interested politician, 
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𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠)𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡0� ∶= 𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠 � � 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝜆𝜆−𝑠𝑠)𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃 �?̂?𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝑠𝑠)�𝜆𝜆,𝑑𝑑�𝜆𝜆��𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾�𝐾𝐾(𝜆𝜆),𝐿𝐿(𝜆𝜆)�𝜏𝜏�
𝑡𝑡0
− 𝛿𝛿�𝑑𝑑�𝜆𝜆 , ?̂?𝜏𝑊𝑊(𝑠𝑠)�𝜆𝜆,𝑑𝑑�𝜆𝜆�𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿�𝐾𝐾(𝜆𝜆),𝐿𝐿(𝜆𝜆)�, ?̂?𝜏𝐶𝐶(𝑠𝑠)�𝜆𝜆,𝑑𝑑�𝜆𝜆�?̂?𝑐(𝑠𝑠)�𝜆𝜆,𝑑𝑑�𝜆𝜆�� 𝑑𝑑𝜆𝜆� 𝑑𝑑�(𝑡𝑡0) = 𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡0�
= 𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠 � � 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝜆𝜆−𝑡𝑡0)𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃 �?̂?𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡0)�𝜆𝜆,𝑑𝑑�𝜆𝜆��𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾�𝐾𝐾(𝜆𝜆),𝐿𝐿(𝜆𝜆)�𝜏𝜏�
𝑡𝑡0
− 𝛿𝛿�𝑑𝑑�𝜆𝜆 , ?̂?𝜏𝑊𝑊(𝑡𝑡0)�𝜆𝜆,𝑑𝑑�𝜆𝜆�𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿�𝐾𝐾(𝜆𝜆),𝐿𝐿(𝜆𝜆)�, ?̂?𝜏𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡0)�𝜆𝜆, 𝑑𝑑�𝜆𝜆�?̂?𝑐(𝑡𝑡0)�𝜆𝜆,𝑑𝑑�𝜆𝜆�� 𝑑𝑑𝜆𝜆� 𝑑𝑑�(𝑡𝑡0) = 𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡0� 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡0−𝑠𝑠)
= 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡0 � � 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝜆𝜆−𝑡𝑡0)𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃 �?̂?𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡0)�𝜆𝜆,𝑑𝑑�𝜆𝜆��𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾�𝐾𝐾(𝜆𝜆),𝐿𝐿(𝜆𝜆)�𝜏𝜏�
𝑡𝑡0
− 𝛿𝛿�𝑑𝑑�𝜆𝜆 , ?̂?𝜏𝑊𝑊(𝑡𝑡0)�𝜆𝜆,𝑑𝑑�𝜆𝜆�𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿�𝐾𝐾(𝜆𝜆),𝐿𝐿(𝜆𝜆)�, ?̂?𝜏𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡0)�𝜆𝜆, 𝑑𝑑�𝜆𝜆�?̂?𝑐(𝑡𝑡0)�𝜆𝜆,𝑑𝑑�𝜆𝜆�� 𝑑𝑑𝜆𝜆� 𝑑𝑑�(𝑡𝑡0) = 𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡0� 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡0−𝑠𝑠)
∶= 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡0−𝑠𝑠) 𝑉𝑉(𝑡𝑡0)𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡0� 
where 𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠)𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡0� measures the expected present value of the strongly self-interested politician’s 
payoff in the time interval [𝑡𝑡0, ?̂?𝜏)   when 𝑑𝑑�(𝑡𝑡0) = 𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡0  and when the game starts from time s ≤ 𝑡𝑡0. 
Similarly, for the cooperative game, we obtain, 
𝑊𝑊(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗� = 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡0−𝑠𝑠)𝑊𝑊(𝑡𝑡0)�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗� 
where 𝑊𝑊(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗� measures the expected present value of the cooperative payoff in the time 
interval [𝑡𝑡0, 𝜏𝜏∗∗)   when 𝑑𝑑∗∗(𝑡𝑡0) = 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗ and when the game starts from time s ≤ 𝑡𝑡0. 
Now, we can obtain the Nash bargaining solution\Shapley value along the cooperative optimal 
trajectory �𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗�𝑡𝑡0=𝑠𝑠𝜏𝜏∗∗  as follows, 
𝜉𝜉(𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗� = 𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗� + 12 �𝑊𝑊(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗� − ∑ 𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗 �𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗�𝑗𝑗∈{𝐻𝐻,𝑃𝑃} � = 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡0−𝑠𝑠) �𝑉𝑉(𝑡𝑡0)𝑠𝑠�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗� +12 �𝑊𝑊(𝑡𝑡0)�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗� − ∑ 𝑉𝑉(𝑡𝑡0)𝑗𝑗 �𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗�𝑗𝑗∈{𝐻𝐻,𝑃𝑃} �� = 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡0−𝑠𝑠)𝜉𝜉(𝑡𝑡0)𝑠𝑠�𝑡𝑡0, 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗�. 
for 𝑠𝑠 ∈ {𝐻𝐻,𝑃𝑃}, s ≤ 𝑡𝑡0 ≤ 𝜏𝜏∗∗and 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗ ∈ 𝛯𝛯𝑡𝑡0∗∗. And this proof is complete. ■ 
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  As noted by Yeung and Petrosyan (2006) that though one of the most commonly used allocation 
principles is the Shapley value, however, equal imputation of cooperative gains may not be totally 
agreeable to the players when players are asymmetric in their sizes of noncooperative payoffs. For 
example, in the current context, the noncooperative payoffs of the representative household and 
the self-interested politician may be asymmetric in reality owing to unequal social status. So, to 
overcome this, we also consider the following allocation principle in which the players’ shares of 
the gain from cooperation are proportional to the relative sizes of their expected noncooperative 
payoffs. To be exact, the corresponding imputation scheme satisfies, 
Definition 11 (Proportional Distribution). In the present cooperative game 𝛤𝛤𝐶𝐶(𝑑𝑑0, 𝜏𝜏∗∗ − 𝑠𝑠), an 
imputation, 
𝜉𝜉(𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑0) = 𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑0)∑ 𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗 (𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑0)𝑗𝑗∈{𝐻𝐻,𝑃𝑃} 𝑊𝑊(𝑠𝑠)(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑0) 
should be assigned to player 𝑠𝑠, for 𝑠𝑠 ∈ {𝐻𝐻,𝑃𝑃}; and in the sub-game 𝛤𝛤𝐶𝐶�𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗, 𝜏𝜏∗∗ − 𝑡𝑡0� for 𝑡𝑡0 ∈ [𝑠𝑠, 𝜏𝜏∗∗], 
an imputation, 
𝜉𝜉(𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗� = 𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠�𝑡𝑡0, 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗�∑ 𝑉𝑉(𝑠𝑠)𝑗𝑗 �𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗�𝑗𝑗∈{𝐻𝐻,𝑃𝑃} 𝑊𝑊(𝑠𝑠)�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗� 
is assigned to player 𝑠𝑠, for 𝑠𝑠 ∈ {𝐻𝐻,𝑃𝑃} and 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗ ∈ 𝛯𝛯𝑡𝑡0∗∗. 
Theorem 11 (Sub-Game Consistency of the Proportional Distribution). The proportional- 
distribution imputation 𝜉𝜉(𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠�𝑡𝑡0,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗�  given in Definition 11 provides us with a sub-game consistent 
imputation for the cooperative game 𝛤𝛤𝐶𝐶(𝑑𝑑0, 𝜏𝜏∗∗ − 𝑠𝑠) for 𝑠𝑠 ∈ {𝐻𝐻,𝑃𝑃}, 𝑠𝑠 ≤ 𝑡𝑡0 ≤ 𝜏𝜏∗∗ and 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡0∗∗ ∈ 𝛯𝛯𝑡𝑡0∗∗. 
Proof. The proof is quite similar to that of Theorem 10, so we take it omitted. ■ 
Up to the present step, we have discussed the relevant issues, i.e., group rationality, individual 
rationality, Pareto-optimal principle, and sub-game consistency of the above cooperative stochastic 
differential game between the representative household and the strongly self-interested politician. 
Now, we are in the position to derive the cooperative-equilibrium minimum-time needed to 
economic maturity. 
By solving Problem 6 and also employing similar arguments as in Theorem 5, we get, 
Theorem 12 (Cooperative-Equilibrium Minimum-Time Needed to Economic Maturity: 
Existence). 
a) Suppose that we can find a function 𝒜𝒜𝐶𝐶:𝐷𝐷� → ℝ such that, 
(i) 𝒜𝒜𝐶𝐶 ∈ 𝐶𝐶1(𝐷𝐷) ∩ 𝐶𝐶(𝐷𝐷�) 
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(ii) 𝒜𝒜𝐶𝐶 ≥ 𝑒𝑒𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢�𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛  on 𝐷𝐷 and lim𝑡𝑡→𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷 𝒜𝒜𝐶𝐶(𝜁𝜁(𝑡𝑡)) = 𝑒𝑒𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢�𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛 (𝜁𝜁(𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷))𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷<∞} a.s. ℙ𝜁𝜁0  
Define 𝐺𝐺 ∶= �𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷;  𝒜𝒜𝐶𝐶(𝜁𝜁0) > 𝑒𝑒𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢�𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛 (𝜁𝜁0)� and suppose 𝜁𝜁(𝑡𝑡) spends 0 time on 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺 a.s. ℙ𝜁𝜁0 , 
i.e., 
(iii) 𝔼𝔼𝜁𝜁0�∫ 𝜒𝜒𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺 (𝜁𝜁(𝑡𝑡))𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠 � = 0 for all 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷, and suppose that, 
(iv) 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺 is a Lipschitz surface. 
Moreover, suppose the following conditions: 
(v) 𝒜𝒜𝐶𝐶 ∈ 𝐶𝐶2(𝐷𝐷 ∖ 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺) and the second order derivatives of 𝒜𝒜𝐶𝐶  are locally bounded near 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺 
(vi) 𝒜𝒜𝑐𝑐∗∗,�𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾∗∗,𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊∗∗ ,𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶∗∗�𝒜𝒜𝐶𝐶 ≤ 0 on 𝐷𝐷 ∖ 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺 
Then, 𝒜𝒜𝐶𝐶(𝜁𝜁0) ≥ 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛 ,𝜏𝜏∗∗(𝜁𝜁0) for all 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷 
b) Suppose, in addition to the above conditions, that, 
(vii) 𝒜𝒜𝑐𝑐∗∗,�𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾∗∗,𝜏𝜏𝑊𝑊∗∗ ,𝜏𝜏𝐶𝐶∗∗�𝒜𝒜𝐶𝐶 = 0 on 𝐺𝐺 
(viii) 𝜏𝜏𝐺𝐺 ∶= inf{𝑡𝑡 > 𝑠𝑠;  𝜁𝜁(𝑡𝑡) ∉ 𝐺𝐺} < ∞ a.s. ℙ𝜁𝜁0  for 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷, and 
(ix) The family {𝒜𝒜𝐶𝐶−(𝜁𝜁(𝜏𝜏));  𝜏𝜏 ≤ 𝜏𝜏𝐺𝐺 , 𝜏𝜏 ∈ 𝒯𝒯} is uniformly integrable w.r.t. ℙ𝜁𝜁0  for all 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷 
Then, 𝒜𝒜𝐶𝐶(𝜁𝜁0) = 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛 ,𝜏𝜏∗∗(𝜁𝜁0) = sup
𝜏𝜏∈𝒯𝒯
𝔼𝔼𝑠𝑠�𝑒𝑒
𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢�𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛 (𝜁𝜁(𝜏𝜏))� for all 𝜁𝜁0 ∈ 𝐷𝐷 
and, 
𝜏𝜏∗∗ = 𝜏𝜏𝐺𝐺  
is an optimal stopping time for this problem. 
In addition to that, we have, 
Corollary 3. In principle, the cooperative-equilibrium minimum-time needed to economic maturity 𝜏𝜏∗∗ can 
be further computed by the following equality, 
𝑊𝑊(𝑠𝑠)�𝜏𝜏∗∗,𝑑𝑑(𝜏𝜏∗∗)� = 𝒜𝒜𝐶𝐶(𝜁𝜁0) 
Proof. Combining (16) with Theorem 12 produces the desired result. ■ 
Case 2. Suppose that there is a semi-strongly self-interested politician in the economy. 
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Case 3. Suppose that there is a weakly self-interested politician in the economy. 
Noting that the discussions corresponding to Cases 2 and 3 are quite similar to that of Case 1, we 
hence take them omitted and leave them to the interested readers. Furthermore, it would be 
interesting to comparatively study the cooperative equilibrium minimum-time needed to economic 
maturity corresponding to different cases, i.e., different political institutional arrangements. That is, 
the framework presented here makes it possible to evaluate the economic efficiency of political 
institutions from the perspective of economic development. As emphasized by North (1994) that 
economic and political institutions are the underlying determinants of economic performance and 
also argued by Acemoglu et al. (2005b) that institutions are the fundamental cause of economic 
growth, the paper has built up a baseline framework for us to explore the role institutions play in 
economic maturity, especially from the viewpoint of time dimension. And hence our results would 
be seen as a supplement to those of North (1994) and Acemoglu et al. (2005b). 
Now, provided the sequential-equilibrium minimum-time needed to economic maturity 𝜏𝜏∗ , 
Markov-equilibrium minimum-time needed to economic maturity ?̂?𝜏 , and the cooperative- 
equilibrium minimum-time needed to economic maturity 𝜏𝜏∗∗, given in Theorems 5, 7 and 12, 
respectively, we can then investigate the following issue: which approach will lead us to much 
faster economic maturity? Lancaster (1973) and Kaitala and Pohjola (1990) argued that cooperation 
between the government and the firm will be more beneficial compared to the dynamic inefficiency 
of capitalism. Moreover, Leong and Huang (2010) demonstrates that cooperation is always Pareto 
optimal compared to the non-cooperative Markovian Nash equilibrium although the cooperative 
solution is indeterminate. Apart from these papers, the present model defines the concept of 
dynamic inefficiency of capitalism in the sense of the minimum-time needed to economic maturity. 
In other words, if the cooperation between the self-interested politician and the representative 
household will lead to much faster speed of economic maturity, then there exists dynamic 
inefficiency of capitalism in the underlying economy. Furthermore, if we interpret different game 
structures as different institutional arrangements (e.g., North, 1990; Hurwicz, 1996; Williamson, 
2000; Amable, 2003), then we provide a basic framework to analyze different speeds of economic 
maturity corresponding to different institutional arrangements. This indeed shows new approach 
and also new perspective for those studies focused on underdeveloped economies. 
Finally, it is particularly worth emphasizing that the equilibrium minimum-times needed to 
economic maturity derived in the above theorems strictly depend on the initial value of the 
underlying economic system. This has to some extent reflected the well-known path-dependence 
effect analyzed and emphasized by North (1990). In other words, we argue that, besides in the 
process of institutional changes, path-dependence effect also plays a crucial role in economic 
development for those underdeveloped economies. What is more, as you can see in the following 
section, one can even proceed to the comparative static analysis of the equilibrium minimum-time 
needed to economic maturity with respect to the initial capital stock of the abstract economy. This 
of course will show us very rich and also interesting economic intuition and economic implication 
of the mathematical model. And it, therefore, would be regarded as an advantage of the framework 
established in the paper. 
5. Examples: Closed-Form Solutions 
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In this section, we will take the following case for example, 
Case 1. Suppose that there is a strongly self-interested politician in the economy. 
In order to make things easier and also derive closed-form solutions, we adopt the following 
production technology instead of that in (5), 
𝑌𝑌(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡) 
with 𝐴𝐴 > 0, an exogenously given constant. Also, we shall consider a simple form of (6), i.e., 
?̇?𝐾(𝑡𝑡) = �1 − 𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡)�(𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿)𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡) − �1 − 𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡)�𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡) 
where 𝜃𝜃 stands for savings rate of the representative household. So, (8) becomes, 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡) = ��1 − 𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡)�(𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿) + 𝜎𝜎2 − 𝑛𝑛 − �1 − 𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡)�𝐴𝐴�𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 − 𝜎𝜎𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡)                    (19) 
5.1 Risk-Aversion Politician 
It is assumed that there is a risk-aversion politician in the economy. And both the self-interested 
politician and the representative household exhibit log preference. In particular, here we without 
loss of generality put 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0 instead of 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝑠𝑠  which is used in the previous sections. So, the 
optimization problem facing the representative household reads as follows, 
max0<𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡)<1𝔼𝔼 �� 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑠𝑠+𝑡𝑡)ln ��1 − 𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡)�𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�𝜏𝜏∗0 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑠𝑠+𝜏𝜏∗)ln ��1 − 𝜃𝜃(𝜏𝜏∗)�𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑(𝜏𝜏∗)�𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏∗<∞}�      (20) 
subject to (19). Applying Computation Algorithm I shows that, 
Proposition 1. Provided the optimal stopping time 𝜏𝜏∗ and the taxation policy of the strongly self-interested 
politician, we can get the optimal savings rate as 𝜃𝜃∗(𝑡𝑡) ≡ 𝜃𝜃∗ = 1 − 𝜌𝜌
𝐴𝐴
 by solving the problem in (20). 
Proof. The proof is quite easy and hence we take it omitted. ■ 
The optimization problem facing the self-interested politician is expressed as follows, 
max0<𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾 (𝑡𝑡)<1𝔼𝔼 �� 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑠𝑠+𝑡𝑡)ln�𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡)(𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿)𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�𝜏𝜏∗0 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃,𝜏𝜏∗𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏∗<∞}�                                (21) 
subject to (19) and Proposition 1. 
Proposition 2. Conditional on Computation Algorithm I and Proposition 1, we get by solving the problem 
in (21) the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium capital-income tax rate as 𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾∗ (𝑡𝑡) ≡ 𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾∗ = 𝜌𝜌𝐴𝐴−𝛿𝛿 and also the 
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following boundary condition, 
𝐽𝐽𝑃𝑃�𝜏𝜏∗, 𝑑𝑑(𝜏𝜏∗)� ∶= 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑠𝑠+𝜏𝜏∗) ��1
𝜌𝜌
ln𝜌𝜌 + 1
𝜌𝜌2 (𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑛𝑛 + 𝜎𝜎2 − 𝜌𝜌) − 1𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎𝜎22𝜌𝜌2� + 1𝜌𝜌 ln𝑑𝑑(𝜏𝜏∗)� = 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃,𝜏𝜏∗𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏∗<∞}. 
Proof. Based on Proposition 1, we have the following Bellman-Isaacs-Fleming equation, 
−𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)� − 12𝜎𝜎2𝑑𝑑2(𝑡𝑡)𝐽𝐽𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃 �𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�= max0<𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡)<1�𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑠𝑠+𝑡𝑡)ln�𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡)(𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿)𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�+ 𝐽𝐽𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡, 𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)��1 − 𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡)�(𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿) + 𝜎𝜎2 − 𝑛𝑛 − 𝜌𝜌��                                                              (22) 
Performing the maximization gives, 
𝐽𝐽𝑑𝑑
𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)(𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿) = 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑠𝑠+𝑡𝑡) 1
𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡)                                                      (23) 
If we put, 
𝐽𝐽𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)� = 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑠𝑠+𝑡𝑡)�𝐶𝐶1 + 𝐶𝐶2ln�𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)��                                                     (24) 
which combines with (23) implies that, 1 = (𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿)𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡)𝐶𝐶2                                                                            (25) 
Inserting (24) and (25) into (22) yields, 
𝜌𝜌�𝐶𝐶1 + 𝐶𝐶2ln�𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�� + 12𝜎𝜎2𝐶𝐶2 = ln�𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)� − ln𝐶𝐶2 + 𝐶𝐶2(𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑛𝑛 + 𝜎𝜎2 − 𝜌𝜌) − 1 
which shows that 𝐶𝐶2 = 1𝜌𝜌 and, 
𝐶𝐶1 = 1𝜌𝜌 ln𝜌𝜌 + 1𝜌𝜌2 (𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑛𝑛 + 𝜎𝜎2 − 𝜌𝜌) − 1𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎𝜎22𝜌𝜌2 
which gives the desired result and hence the proof is complete. ■ 
  Now, applying Propositions 1 and 2 reveals that (19) can be rewritten as follows, 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡) = (𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑛𝑛 + 𝜎𝜎2 − 2𝜌𝜌)𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 − 𝜎𝜎𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡)                                      (19′) 
And so the corresponding optimal stopping problem can be written as follows, 
𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃,𝜏𝜏∗𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏∗<∞} ∶= sup
𝜏𝜏∈𝒯𝒯
𝔼𝔼(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑)�𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑠𝑠+𝜏𝜏)ln�𝜌𝜌𝑑𝑑(𝜏𝜏)�𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏<∞}� 
subject to (19’). The generator in (9) can be written as, 
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𝒜𝒜𝒜𝒜(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑) = 𝜕𝜕𝒜𝒜
𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠
+ (𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑛𝑛 + 𝜎𝜎2 − 2𝜌𝜌)𝑑𝑑 𝜕𝜕𝒜𝒜
𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑
+ 12𝜎𝜎2𝑑𝑑2 𝜕𝜕2𝒜𝒜𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑2  
If we try a function 𝒜𝒜 of the form, 
𝒜𝒜(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑) = 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝜇𝜇  
for some constant 𝜇𝜇 ∈ ℝ. We thus get, 
𝒜𝒜𝒜𝒜(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑) = 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝜇𝜇 �−𝜌𝜌 + (𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑛𝑛 + 𝜎𝜎2 − 2𝜌𝜌)𝜇𝜇 + 12𝜎𝜎2𝜇𝜇(𝜇𝜇 − 1)� ∶= 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝜇𝜇ℎ(𝜇𝜇) 
Solving equation ℎ(𝜇𝜇) = 0 gives the unique positive root, 
𝜇𝜇 = −[2(𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑛𝑛 − 2𝜌𝜌) + 𝜎𝜎2] + �[2(𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑛𝑛 − 2𝜌𝜌) + 𝜎𝜎2]2 + 8𝜎𝜎2𝜌𝜌2𝜎𝜎2                       (26) 
With this value of 𝜇𝜇 we put, 
𝒜𝒜(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑) = � 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑𝜇𝜇 ,    (𝑠𝑠, 𝑑𝑑) ∈ 𝐺𝐺
𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠 ln(𝜌𝜌𝑑𝑑), (𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑) ∉ 𝐺𝐺                                                                     (27) 
for some constant 𝐶𝐶, to be determined. If we let 𝑠𝑠(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑) ∶= 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠 ln(𝜌𝜌𝑑𝑑), we have, 
𝒜𝒜𝑠𝑠(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑) = 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠 �−𝜌𝜌ln(𝜌𝜌𝑑𝑑) + �𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑛𝑛 − 2𝜌𝜌 + 12𝜎𝜎2�� > 0 ⇔ 𝑑𝑑 < 1𝜌𝜌 exp �1𝜌𝜌 �𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑛𝑛 − 2𝜌𝜌 + 12𝜎𝜎2�� 
Therefore, we put, 
𝛴𝛴 ∶= �(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑);  𝑑𝑑 < 1
𝜌𝜌
exp �1
𝜌𝜌
�𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑛𝑛 − 2𝜌𝜌 + 12𝜎𝜎2��� 
Thus, we guess that the continuation region 𝐺𝐺 has the form, 
𝐺𝐺 ∶= {(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑);  0 < 𝑑𝑑 < 𝑑𝑑∗}                                                                       (28) 
for some 𝑑𝑑∗ such that 𝛴𝛴 ⊆ 𝐺𝐺, i.e., 
𝑑𝑑∗ ≥
1
𝜌𝜌
exp �1
𝜌𝜌
�𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑛𝑛 − 2𝜌𝜌 + 12𝜎𝜎2�� 
Hence, by (28) we can rewrite (27) as follows, 
𝒜𝒜(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑) = � 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑𝜇𝜇 ,    0 < 𝑑𝑑 < 𝑑𝑑∗
𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠 ln(𝜌𝜌𝑑𝑑), 𝑑𝑑 ≥ 𝑑𝑑∗  
We without loss of generality guess that the value function 𝒜𝒜 is 𝐶𝐶1  at 𝑑𝑑 = 𝑑𝑑∗  and this will 
naturally lead to the following smooth-fit conditions, 
𝐶𝐶(𝑑𝑑∗)𝜇𝜇 = ln(𝜌𝜌𝑑𝑑∗)  (continuity at 𝑑𝑑 = 𝑑𝑑∗) 
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𝐶𝐶𝜇𝜇(𝑑𝑑∗)𝜇𝜇−1 = (𝑑𝑑∗)−1  (differentiability at 𝑑𝑑 = 𝑑𝑑∗) 
from which we thus derive, 
𝑑𝑑∗ = 1
𝜌𝜌
exp �1
𝜇𝜇
�& 𝐶𝐶 = 𝜇𝜇−1 �1
𝜌𝜌
exp �1
𝜇𝜇
��
−𝜇𝜇                                                     (29) 
Proposition 3. Under the above constructions and certain parameter constraints, we obtain the sequential- 
equilibrium minimum-time needed to economic maturity denoted by 𝜏𝜏∗ = 𝜏𝜏𝐺𝐺 ∶= inf{𝑡𝑡 > 0; 𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑑𝑑∗}. In 
other words, 𝑠𝑠∗(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑) ∶= 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝜇𝜇−1(𝑑𝑑∗)−𝜇𝜇𝑑𝑑𝜇𝜇 = 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃,𝜏𝜏∗  is a supermeanvalued majorant of 𝑠𝑠(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑) with 𝑑𝑑∗ 
and 𝜇𝜇 given by (29) and (26), respectively. 
Proof. See the proof of Theorem 1 of Dai (2012). ■ 
Corollary 4. There is a closed-form solution for the sequential-equilibrium minimum-time needed to 
economic maturity 𝜏𝜏∗, and indeed, 
𝜏𝜏∗ = 1
𝜌𝜌
ln�𝜇𝜇(𝑑𝑑∗)𝜇𝜇𝑑𝑑−𝜇𝜇 ��1
𝜌𝜌
ln𝜌𝜌 + 1
𝜌𝜌2 (𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑛𝑛 + 𝜎𝜎2 − 𝜌𝜌) − 1𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎𝜎22𝜌𝜌2� + 1𝜌𝜌 ln𝑑𝑑∗�� 
where 𝑑𝑑∗ and 𝜇𝜇 are given by (29) and (26), respectively, and 𝑑𝑑 denotes the initial condition. 
Proof. Combining the boundary condition in Proposition 2 with Proposition 3 easily confirms the 
required assertion. ■ 
In what follows, we will derive the closed-form solution corresponding to cooperative economic 
maturity. Before doing this, we establish, 
Proposition 4. There exists a Markov feedback Nash equilibrium solution denoted by �𝜃𝜃�, ?̂?𝜏𝐾𝐾� = �1 −
𝜌𝜌
𝐴𝐴
, 𝜌𝜌
𝐴𝐴−𝛿𝛿
�, and the corresponding value functions are given by, 
𝑉𝑉𝐻𝐻(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)) = 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)) = 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑠𝑠+𝑡𝑡) ��1
𝜌𝜌
ln𝜌𝜌 + 1
𝜌𝜌2 (𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑛𝑛 + 𝜎𝜎2 − 𝜌𝜌) − 1𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎𝜎22𝜌𝜌2� + 1𝜌𝜌 ln𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�. 
Proof. This proof is quite similar to those of Propositions 1 and 2, and hence we omit it and leave 
it to the interested reader. ■ 
Now, if the representative household and the strongly self-interested politician can cooperate 
with each other, then the corresponding optimization problem amounts to, 
max0<𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾 (𝑡𝑡)<10<𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡)<1 𝔼𝔼�� 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑠𝑠+𝑡𝑡) �ln�𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡)(𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿)𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)� + ln ��1 − 𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡)�𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)��𝜏𝜏
∗∗
0 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
+ 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛 ,𝜏𝜏∗∗𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏∗∗<∞}�                                                                                                                  (30) 
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subject to (19). By solving the problem in (30), one can establish, 
Proposition 5. There is a cooperative solution denoted by {𝜃𝜃∗∗, 𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾∗∗} = �1 − 𝜌𝜌2𝐴𝐴 , 𝜌𝜌2(𝐴𝐴−𝛿𝛿)� , and the 
corresponding value function is, 
𝑊𝑊(𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)) = 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑠𝑠+𝑡𝑡) ��− 2
𝜌𝜌
ln 2
𝜌𝜌
+ 2
𝜌𝜌2 (𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑛𝑛 + 𝜎𝜎2) − 2𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎𝜎2𝜌𝜌2� + 2𝜌𝜌 ln𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�. 
Proof. This proof is quite similar to the above propositions, so we take it omitted. ■ 
Proposition 6. Provided the cooperative solution in Proposition 5, it is shown that group rationality, 
individual rationality and sub-game consistency are all fulfilled when we employ Nash bargaining solution\ 
Shapley value as the imputation scheme. 
Proof. Based upon Theorem 10, Propositions 4 and 5, the required assertions are easily 
demonstrated, and we therefore leave the details to the interested reader. ■ 
Now, we are in the position to consider the following optimal stopping problem, 
𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛 ,𝜏𝜏∗∗𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏∗∗<∞} : = sup
𝜏𝜏∈𝒯𝒯
𝔼𝔼(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑) �𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑠𝑠+𝜏𝜏)ln�𝜌𝜌2 𝑑𝑑(𝜏𝜏)�2 𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏<∞}� 
subject to, 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡) = (𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑛𝑛 + 𝜎𝜎2 − 𝜌𝜌)𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 − 𝜎𝜎𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡) 
So, the generator in (9) can be rewritten as follows, 
𝒜𝒜𝒜𝒜(𝑠𝑠, 𝑑𝑑) = 𝜕𝜕𝒜𝒜
𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠
+ (𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑛𝑛 + 𝜎𝜎2 − 𝜌𝜌)𝑑𝑑 𝜕𝜕𝒜𝒜
𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑
+ 12𝜎𝜎2𝑑𝑑2 𝜕𝜕2𝒜𝒜𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑2  
If we try, 
𝒜𝒜(𝑠𝑠, 𝑑𝑑) = 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝜖𝜖  
for some constant 𝜖𝜖 ∈ ℝ. We thus get, 
𝒜𝒜𝒜𝒜(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑) = 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝜖𝜖 �−𝜌𝜌 + (𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑛𝑛 + 𝜎𝜎2 − 𝜌𝜌)𝜖𝜖 + 12𝜎𝜎2𝜖𝜖(𝜖𝜖 − 1)� ∶= 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝜖𝜖ℎ(𝜖𝜖) 
Solving equation ℎ(𝜖𝜖) = 0 produces, 
𝜖𝜖 = −[2(𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑛𝑛 − 𝜌𝜌) + 𝜎𝜎2] + �[2(𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑛𝑛 − 𝜌𝜌) + 𝜎𝜎2]2 + 8𝜎𝜎2𝜌𝜌2𝜎𝜎2                        (31) 
With this value of 𝜖𝜖 we put, 
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𝒜𝒜(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑) = � 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑𝜖𝜖 ,         (𝑠𝑠, 𝑑𝑑) ∈ 𝐺𝐺
𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠 ln �𝜌𝜌2 𝑑𝑑�2 , (𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑) ∉ 𝐺𝐺                                                                     (32) 
for some constant 𝐶𝐶 remains to be determined. If we let 𝑠𝑠(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑) ∶= 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠 ln �𝜌𝜌2 𝑑𝑑�2, we obtain, 
𝒜𝒜𝑠𝑠(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑) = 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠 �−𝜌𝜌ln �𝜌𝜌2 𝑑𝑑�2 + 2(𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑛𝑛 − 𝜌𝜌) + 𝜎𝜎2� > 0 ⇔ 𝑑𝑑 < 2𝜌𝜌 exp � 12𝜌𝜌 [2(𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑛𝑛 − 𝜌𝜌) + 𝜎𝜎2]� 
So, we put, 
𝛴𝛴 ∶= �(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑);  𝑑𝑑 < 2
𝜌𝜌
exp � 12𝜌𝜌 [2(𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑛𝑛 − 𝜌𝜌) + 𝜎𝜎2]�� 
Thus, we guess that the continuation region 𝐺𝐺 has the form, 
𝐺𝐺 ∶= {(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑);  0 < 𝑑𝑑 < 𝑑𝑑∗∗}                                                                       (33) 
for some 𝑑𝑑∗∗ such that 𝛴𝛴 ⊆ 𝐺𝐺, i.e., 
𝑑𝑑∗∗ ≥
2
𝜌𝜌
exp � 12𝜌𝜌 [2(𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑛𝑛 − 𝜌𝜌) + 𝜎𝜎2]� 
Hence, by (33) we can rewrite (32) as follows, 
𝒜𝒜(𝑠𝑠, 𝑑𝑑) = � 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑𝜖𝜖 ,        0 < 𝑑𝑑 < 𝑑𝑑∗∗
𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠 ln �𝜌𝜌2 𝑑𝑑�2 , 𝑑𝑑 ≥ 𝑑𝑑∗∗  
And hence we have the following smooth-fit conditions, 
𝐶𝐶(𝑑𝑑∗∗)𝜖𝜖 = ln �𝜌𝜌2 𝑑𝑑∗∗�2  (continuity at 𝑑𝑑 = 𝑑𝑑∗∗) 
𝐶𝐶𝜖𝜖(𝑑𝑑∗∗)𝜖𝜖−1 = 2(𝑑𝑑∗∗)−1  (differentiability at 𝑑𝑑 = 𝑑𝑑∗∗) 
from which we thus obtain, 
𝑑𝑑∗∗ = 2
𝜌𝜌
exp �1
𝜖𝜖
�& 𝐶𝐶 = 2𝜖𝜖−1 �2
𝜌𝜌
exp �1
𝜖𝜖
��
−𝜖𝜖                                                        (34) 
Proposition 7. Under the above constructions and certain parameter constraints, then there exists a 
cooperative-equilibrium minimum-time needed to economic maturity denoted by 𝜏𝜏∗∗ = 𝜏𝜏𝐺𝐺 ∶= inf{𝑡𝑡 >0; 𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑑𝑑∗∗}. In other words, 𝑠𝑠∗∗(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑) ∶= 2 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝜖𝜖−1(𝑑𝑑∗∗)−𝜖𝜖𝑑𝑑𝜖𝜖 = 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛 ,𝜏𝜏∗∗ is a supermeanvalued 
majorant of 𝑠𝑠(𝑠𝑠, 𝑑𝑑) with 𝑑𝑑∗∗ and 𝜖𝜖 given by (34) and (31), respectively. 
Proof. See the proof of Theorem 1 of Dai (2012). ■ 
Similar to Corollary 4, we establish, 
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Corollary 5. There is a closed-form solution for the cooperative-equilibrium minimum-time needed to 
economic maturity 𝜏𝜏∗∗, and in fact, 
𝜏𝜏∗∗ = 1
𝜌𝜌
ln�12 𝜖𝜖(𝑑𝑑∗∗)𝜖𝜖𝑑𝑑−𝜖𝜖 ��− 2𝜌𝜌 ln 2𝜌𝜌 + 2𝜌𝜌2 (𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑛𝑛 + 𝜎𝜎2) − 2𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎𝜎2𝜌𝜌2� + 2𝜌𝜌 ln𝑑𝑑∗∗�� 
where 𝑑𝑑∗∗ and 𝜖𝜖 are given by (34) and (31), respectively, and 𝑑𝑑 denotes the initial condition. 
Proof. Combining Proposition 5 with Proposition 7 easily confirms the required result. ■ 
Corollary 6. Cooperation between the representative household and the strongly self-interested politician 
will lead us to much faster economic maturity than that of sequential action when, 
𝜖𝜖(𝑑𝑑∗∗)𝜖𝜖𝑑𝑑−𝜖𝜖 ��− 1
𝜌𝜌
ln 2
𝜌𝜌
+ 1
𝜌𝜌2 (𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑛𝑛 + 𝜎𝜎2) − 1𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎𝜎22𝜌𝜌2� + 1𝜌𝜌 ln𝑑𝑑∗∗�
< 𝜇𝜇(𝑑𝑑∗)𝜇𝜇𝑑𝑑−𝜇𝜇 ��1
𝜌𝜌
ln𝜌𝜌 + 1
𝜌𝜌2 (𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑛𝑛 + 𝜎𝜎2 − 𝜌𝜌) − 1𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎𝜎22𝜌𝜌2� + 1𝜌𝜌 ln𝑑𝑑∗� 
in which 𝑑𝑑∗∗, 𝜖𝜖, 𝑑𝑑∗ and 𝜇𝜇 are given by (34), (31), (29) and (26), respectively. Otherwise, decentralized 
sequential action will do a better job than that of differential cooperation in the sense of the minimum-time 
needed to economic maturity. 
Proof. It follows from Corollaries 4 and 5 that we have the required result. ■ 
5.2 Risk-Neutral and Risk-Preference Politician 
One can still suppose that the representative household exhibits log preference while the criterion 
of the risk-neutral self-interested politician expressed as follows, 
𝔼𝔼 �� 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑠𝑠+𝑡𝑡)�𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡)(𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿)𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�𝜏𝜏∗0 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃,𝜏𝜏∗𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏∗<∞}� 
And also, the objective of the corresponding optimal stopping problem is given by, 
𝔼𝔼(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑)�𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑠𝑠+𝜏𝜏)�𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾∗ (𝜏𝜏)(𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿)𝑑𝑑(𝜏𝜏)�𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏<∞}� 
Similarly, for the risk-preference self-interested politician, we have the following criterions for 
the politician, 
𝔼𝔼 �� 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑠𝑠+𝑡𝑡) �𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡)(𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿)𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)�𝜛𝜛
𝜛𝜛
𝜏𝜏∗
0 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃,𝜏𝜏∗𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏∗<∞}� 
and, 
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𝔼𝔼(𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑) �𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝑠𝑠+𝜏𝜏) �𝜏𝜏𝐾𝐾∗ (𝜏𝜏)(𝐴𝐴 − 𝛿𝛿)𝑑𝑑(𝜏𝜏)�𝜛𝜛𝜛𝜛 𝜒𝜒{𝜏𝜏<∞}� 
in which 𝜛𝜛 > 1, some given constant. 
Noting that the following discussion is quite similar to that appears in Section 5.1, thus we plan 
to omit it and leave it to the interested reader. Undoubtedly, closed-form solutions can be derived, 
too. Moreover, one can comparatively study the minimum-time needed to economic maturity 
corresponding to different types of politician, and accordingly different types of political institution. 
For example, one specific type of political institution will induce much higher level of economic 
maturity while much slower speed of economic maturity when compared with other types of 
political institution. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Dai (2012), by employing optimal stopping theory, discussed efficient capital accumulation with 
reference to the final state or terminal stocks. And Dai derived closed-form solution by using AK 
production technology. Nevertheless, the present exploration indeed extends Dai’s results from the 
following directions: first, we have provided very general conditions under which the minimum- 
time needed to economic maturity can be computed corresponding to a wide range of preferences 
and technologies; second, in the present study, the role of game structure or institutional 
arrangement has been sufficiently emphasized in determining the minimum-time needed to 
economic maturity; last but not least, we study the minimum-time needed to economic maturity for 
underdeveloped economies and especially under political-economy constraint, i.e., the self- 
interested politician indeed maximizes the corresponding utility from the rent. Dai mainly 
demonstrated the strong convergence of capital accumulation to the efficient capital stock while the 
current paper focusing on the explicit computation and complete characterization of the minimum- 
time needed to economic maturity for those underdeveloped economies and also under political- 
economy constraint. What is more, Dai, in a given institutional arrangement and for given 
preference and technology, provides the condition under which the efficient state is achievable in 
the sense of uniform topology while the present exploration constructing a general framework in 
which one can comparatively evaluate the economic efficiency of different institutional 
arrangements from the viewpoint of the efficient speed (i.e., based on welfare maximization) of 
economic development. In other words, Dai strictly follows the neoclassical framework while the 
current paper is indeed in line with new institutional economics. In particular, we have to some 
extent modeled the underlying idea of Coase (1988) that we need a baseline framework to 
comparatively and sufficiently evaluate the economic efficiency of different institutional 
arrangements in order to make a wise choice during the corresponding institutional changes in 
reality. 
Although optimal stopping theory has been widely used in mathematical finance, no literatures 
except for Dai (2012) notice that this mathematical technique would be very helpful in 
endogenously determining the minimum-time needed to economic maturity in macroeconomics or 
development economics. Indeed, the results stated and proved in Sections 3 and 4 are new to the 
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best of our knowledge. In other words, these theorems should be of independent interest in 
macroeconomics although the major techniques are brought from stochastic analysis (see, Øksendal, 
2003) and cooperative stochastic differential game (see, Yeung and Petrosyan, 2006). For example, 
our specification will naturally lead to the explicit computation of the minimum-time needed to 
economic maturity, as is shown in Section 5. We have provided a general framework by which one 
can establish the minimum-time needed to economic maturity with respect to different game 
structures (or institutional arrangements) between the representative household and the self- 
interested politician. Moreover, our mathematical results show us, for the first time, in which way 
and to what extent preference, technology, economic and political institutions affect the minimum- 
time needed to economic maturity in a stochastic growth model. And this would be regarded as 
one innovation of the paper when compared to Kurz (1965), Phelan and Stacchetti (2001), 
Acemoglu et al. (2008, 2010, 2011), Kaitala and Pohjola (1990), and Leong and Huang (2010). 
It is plausible to argue that in an underdeveloped economy such as China (see, Song et al., 2011), 
the government and the households are motivated to choose appropriate fiscal policies and 
investment strategies, respectively, such that the economy reaches its maturity state as soon as 
possible. Our study has formally modeled the state of economic maturity in a stochastic growth 
model. Moreover, we by employing the optimal stopping theory widely used in mathematical 
finance give a formal definition of the concept of minimum-time needed to economic maturity. 
And it would be regarded as an advantage of the stopping theory that the maximal and sustainable 
capital stock per capita as well as the minimum-time is endogenously determined. Indeed, the 
major goal of the paper is to investigate the effect of game structure on the minimum-time needed 
to economic maturity. That is, if we interpret different game structures as different institutional 
arrangements, then this study provides a basic framework for the comparative study of economic 
maturity under different institutional arrangements. In a simple model of endogenous growth, the 
closed-form solution of the minimum-time needed to economic maturity has been derived with the 
explicit condition, under which cooperation between the representative household and the self- 
interested politician will induce much faster economic maturity than that of decentralized 
sequential action, supplied, too. That is, we have shown an example where individual rationality 
results in dynamic inefficiency under certain institutional arrangement. Nonetheless, it would be 
noticed that our model can also produce the corresponding condition under which dynamic 
sequential game structure corresponding to capitalism in some sense will induce much faster 
economic maturity than that of cooperative stochastic differential game structure in a stochastic 
growth model. 
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